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In critical algorithm studies [44], the “black box” metaphor characterizes algorithmic
systems whose decision-making processes are invisible to their subjects, and yet may
affect them. The implication of this critique is that the decision-making processes
of algorithms are permissible and acceptable because they are altogether invisible.
However, this study contends that algorithms are not only permissible because they
are invisible, and are rather rationalized according to visibilities and representations
that manifest in innumerably diverse ways. Such a project demands an attention
to the visuality and representation of algorithms, which would follow from existing
work in critical algorithm studies that addresses how designed representations of
algorithms influence their perception by users, and in turn shape user perceptions
of algorithms [28, 81, 86]. Following from this work, I contend that investigating
human-interpretable representations of algorithms is key to studying rationalizations
and epistemologies of algorithms, and cannot be discounted from such. In particular,
this study investigates ‘data visualization’ as one instance of these representations,
specifically in order to implicate the practice of representing algorithms interactively
in the rationalization of algorithms. Altogether, the purpose of this approach is
to better understand how the services and decisions of algorithms are rationalized,
and particularly to contend with the prevailing notion that these rationalizations
occur because algorithms are invisible or “black boxed.” Therefore, whereas data
visualization is the principal concern of this study, it also identifies how algorithms
are rationalized by social media platforms, exercise trackers, political discourse, and
artworks.
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To investigate these claims, I develop a collection of algorithms and interactive
data visualizations, entitled Lifestreams, which I use to analyze a publicly accessible
dataset called StudentLife [100, 102]. The StudentLife project in particular proposes
to use algorithms in order to predict and affect the behaviors of students, which is
a paradigm manifest also in data-driven healthcare, work performance evaluation,
and criminal justice. To Antoinette Rouvroy and Thomas Berns [82], how these
algorithms are perceived by their subjects—their students, patients, employees, or
criminals—enables an epistemic rationality that they term “algorithmic governmen-
tality,” according to which algorithmic automation acts on behalf of subjects without
requiring their active participation and reflection. Accordingly, the issue raised by
this work is that algorithmic platforms like StudentLife enable an epistemology that
escapes human comprehension vis-à-vis human judgment, which can be likened to
the problem posed by the “black box.” However, in acknowledging that algorithms
are able to bypass subjects in this way, I am rather interested in how algorithms are
rationalized when subjects perceive and interact with them, for which Lifestreams is
a case in point. In particular, that data visualizations like Lifestreams may rational-
ize algorithms, and yet require users to perceive and participate in the operations of
algorithms, warrants consideration.
Turning to algorithmic governmentality helps at first to identify practices of us-
ing and working with algorithms in which humans are in fact marginalized from the
decision-making processes of algorithms. In this way, algorithmic governmentality
suggests that its epistemic rationality is coextensive with an avoidance of subjects.
What is effectively revealed by this argument is that semiotics is an essential dimen-
sion of this movement whether or not the avoidance of subjects is involved. Plainly,
semiotics is the study of how meaning is produced, interpreted, and communicated,
whether through symbols, codes, or languages. Accordingly, algorithmic governmen-
tality implies that algorithms and data have specific semiotic properties that influence
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how they are interpreted by their subjects. Through calling specific attention to this
claim, this study examines the premises of algorithmic governmentality in order to
address how rationalizations of algorithms, whether or not they entail the removal of
subjects from processes of algorithmic decision-making, may involve representations
like visualizations that are human-interpretable.
Accordingly, the function of Lifestreams in this process is to investigate how the
programmatic and semiotic properties of data, algorithms, and visualization inform
one another. In particular, Lifestreams follows from the proposals of “imaginary
media studies” [69] and “critical making” [76], which demonstrate how designing, im-
plementing, and experimenting with media and computing systems enables studying
relationships that emerge from their designed arrangement. This enables investigating
both the process and product of developing Lifestreams as an extended interaction be-
tween media, algorithmic, and semiotic elements. Therefore, designing and studying
visualization in this way is not to prove how algorithms are universally rationalized by
visualizations, nor even to refute algorithmic governmentality, which would require a
study of how subjects use, perceive, and experience algorithmic systems. Instead, the
object of this study is to investigate how and to what extent the formal properties of
algorithms and algorithmic visualizations confer to their rationalization.
1.1 Motivation
The assignment of this study is interdisciplinary in scope and as such relies on mul-
tiple related bodies of literature and research. In particular, the study operates at
the intersection of critical algorithm studies [44] and visual analytics [95], and is par-
ticularly concerned with visual and interactive presentations of algorithms to users.
Critical algorithm studies represents a diverse array of research regarding the social
implications of developing, using, and interpreting algorithms. From a computer sci-
ence perspective, the field as a whole departs from a conceptualization of algorithms
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as discrete, bounded systems and proceeds to interrogate the socio-technical appara-
tuses of algorithms and algorithmic systems, which not only interact with users at the
level of interfaces, but also have broader epistemic and political implications. With
respect to visual analytics—which integrates human-computer interaction, visualiza-
tion, and machine learning research into an interdisciplinary field—critical algorithm
studies concerns how representations of algorithms are implicated in how algorithms
can be used.
Such a topic has direct implications for research in human-computer interaction
and interface design, specifically with respect to emerging disciplines like “ethical
user experience design” [77]. Ethical user experience design departs from the direc-
tives of traditional human-computer interaction as ensuring system “usability,” and
opts instead for addressing civil liberties and social concerns when developing com-
putational information systems. For example, whereas traditional human-computer
interaction favors a “seamless” design paradigm, according to which users should
not be overwhelmed by extraneous information about algorithms that operate in the
‘background’ of interfaces, ethical user experience design might advocate a “seam-
ful” design that sacrifices interpretative efficiency and clarity for transparency [12].
The concerns of both sides of this discourse are especially relevant to work in visual
analytics, which must balance at least usability and transparency concerns in design-
ing algorithmic information systems that allow users to perceive and interact with
complex algorithmic processes.
This study contributes to the considerations of critical algorithm studies in a way
that might be compared to the directives of ethical user experience design. In par-
ticular, it questions the notion that algorithms are problematic when their processes
are not represented to users, which is reflected in critical algorithms studies discourse
as concerns about algorithms being “black boxed.” The black box metaphor char-
acterizes a regime of algorithmic system design in which knowledge is produced by
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algorithms without human scrutiny or oversight. Accordingly, this knowledge—as
well as the algorithms that produce it—are rationalized when they do not confer to
human investigation and critique. However, this study contends that rationalizations
of algorithms and their decisions do not depend on an absolute flight from human per-
ception and control. Rather, algorithms are rationalized in exceedingly diverse ways,
each of which may provide a handle for ensuring the accountability and scrutiny of
knowledge produced by algorithms, whether according to critical algorithm studies
or ethical user experience design paradigms.
What is at stake is a marginalization of the role of discourse and aesthetics in
shaping appraisals of algorithms, their purposes, and their effects. Recent appeals to
“algorithmic accountability” [26] and “algorithmic transparency” [18], for example,
encourage “reverse engineering” algorithms to extrapolate the logics of black box
algorithms in order to expose and audit their quantitative biases. As genuine as this
directive sounds, this work is only complicit in representing algorithms as rational
systems that are perfected when their causal structures are identified: it articulates
the function of algorithms in society as intelligible in quantitative terms, when in
fact reverse engineering these processes only simulates their interpretability [48]. For
example, Quantitative Input Inference (QII) [18] proposes to achieve ‘algorithmic
transparency’ by calculating algorithmic sensitivity or ‘bias’ to certain inputs, which is
a version of reverse engineering. In doing so, QII rationalizes reverse engineering—as
well as reverse engineered algorithms—with an appeal to ‘algorithmic transparency’
discourse. Accordingly, we might begin to interpret these measures of algorithmic
transparency and bias as a kind of IQ or digital phrenology, which are measures that
either do not account for the entire picture of algorithms or confer to producing it.
In doing so, we can begin to identify how other algorithm discourse and aesthetics,
like those provided by academic publications and visualizations, are implicated in
rationalizations of algorithms.
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To this end, a theory of algorithmic governmentality [82] first identifies ways in
which algorithms are rationalized by data “collection, processing, and application”
procedures that are not transparent and escape human scrutiny. It suggests in partic-
ular that algorithms enable an episteme that diminishes opportunities for the critique
of knowledge produced by algorithms, which this study likens to “black box” dis-
course. In order to evaluate this claim, a semiotic framework is used to identify how
these algorithmic procedures may in fact lend themselves to human interpretation,
and questions whether algorithms ever recede absolutely from human perception. Ac-
cordingly, this study implicates visualizations, interactive games, artworks, and other
representations of algorithms in the rationalization of algorithms and knowledge pro-
duced by algorithms. Crucially, the theoretical frameworks invoked in this study are
not meant to be taken as a matter of fact; instead, they are leveraged to highlight





Antoinette Rouvroy and Thomas Berns propose a theory of algorithmic governmen-
tality in order to characterize a kind of rationality inspired by algorithms that an-
ticipate and affect the behaviors of subjects [82]. The notion of governmentality was
proposed by Michel Foucault during his project to develop an understanding of the
specific techniques and practices that enabled control over the “conduct of human
beings” [33]. Whereas Foucault identified how these techniques evolved with respect
to certain epistemological and institutional paradigms—e.g., the diagnosis of insan-
ity [32], the development of penal law [34]—governmentality was meant to generalize
these techniques and their rationalities as involving an “encounter between techniques
of domination over others and techniques of the self” [78]. Accordingly, Foucault care-
fully differentiates governmentality from the common conceptualization of governance
as an articulation of the “state,” which Foucault takes as a monolithic and poten-
tially reductive abstraction. Instead, governmentality characterizes the formation,
the heterogeneity, and the inherence of techniques of behavior control in enabling the
formation of a working society.
Considering Foucault in light of the extensive authority of algorithms in modern
day culture, Rouvroy and Berns draw into question the seamless applicability of a Fou-
cauldian tradition of governmentality to algorithmic techniques of behavior control.
To accomplish this, Rouvroy and Berns propose algorithmic governmentality in order
to identify what techniques of control are uniquely enabled by algorithms [82]. In
particular, Rouvroy and Berns propose that what makes algorithmic governmentality
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unique and differentiable from other forms of governmentality is that it circumvents
subjectification, or the processes by which individuals autonomously construct them-
selves according to their social and cultural environments. Foucault conceptualizes
subjectification in order to position “techniques of the self” as techniques of gov-
ernmentality and behavior control that are not exerted by physical force but rather
performed by individual subjects according to normative cultural practices (e.g., mar-
riage), vocabularies (e.g., “you” and “I”), and social ideologies (e.g., party politics).
Characteristically, “subjectivation” and “subjectification” involve, respectively, the
construction and concomitant self-construction of individual, reflexive subjects ac-
cording to dominant social codes, a process which Rouvroy and Berns contend that
algorithms can supersede without actively involving subject participation.
Therefore, on acount of the automatic reflexivity of algorithms to data, Rouvroy
and Berns suggest that algorithmic governmentality advances Foucault’s “regimes of
truth” to a more immediate “regime of action” [84], according to which algorithms
begin to act on behalf of subjects without requiring their active participation. Special
to this process is the capacity of algorithms to represent data about individual sub-
jects as statistical “doubles” of them, which are representations of individual subjects
in data that are separate from them and yet can be operationalized to make decisions
about them. This separation of subject and data enables algorithmic governmentality
to deal exclusively with patterns in data that may or may not veridically characterize
subjects themselves: “algorithmic governmentality thus focuses not on individuals,
on subject, but on relations” between data variables [82]. Accordingly, Rouvroy and
Berns suggest that an era of algorithmic governmentality contributes holistically to
the “rarefication” of subjectification [82]—an avoidance of subjects and their sub-
jective reflections—which is supported altogether by the classic, techno-materialist
conceptualization of computation as powerful because its logic is inherently invisible
and therefore obfuscatable [54]. To algorithmic governmentality, whereas statistics
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enables the development of inferences about subjects that can be applied to them
thereafter, algorithms implement an automated, actional, and reflexive statistics that
that can operate without human input.
The features of what Rouvroy terms “digital behaviorism” [83] are worth de-
scribing here in order to elaborate how a critique of algorithmic governmentality is
different from that of statistics. Rouvroy defines digital behaviorism as an episteme
“deserted by empirical and deductive, casual logic” and “in favour of computational,
pre-emptive, context- and behaviour-sensitive management of risks and opportuni-
ties” [83]. To Rouvroy, this epistemology is enabled by algorithms, which can repre-
sent unbounded uncertainties in terms of probabilizable risk, operationalize subjects
according to these terms, and thereby obfuscate the difference between these uncer-
tainties and their operationalized probabilities. In doing so, the algorithmic tech-
niques of digital behaviorism diminish the possibility of “critique,” which Foucault
defines as “a practice that suspends judgment and an opportunity to practice new
values,” opting instead for fully automatic risk pre-emption and aversion [82]. The ar-
gument leveled here—with its recourse to Foucault and implication of probabilizable
risk—finds a comparable precedent in Tiqqun’s “Cybernetic Hypothesis” [97], which
addresses the generalization of an algorithmic rationality to contemporary modes of
governance and economics. Accordingly, the contribution of digital behaviorism is to
identify how the representational and actional capabilities of algorithms contribute to
a new regime of decision-making that departs from traditional statistics and confers
to a new paradigm of governmentality.
Crucially, the arguments proposed by algorithmic governmentality and digital
behaviorism are not about whether algorithms are accurate or verifiable but the extent
to which “relying on the apparent operationality of algorithms spares us a series of
individual and collective perceptual cognitive, evaluative, conventional, institutional,
linguistic efforts or tasks, and, at what price” [82]. Algorithmic governmentality
9
thus concerns the potential and increasing closure of subjectification processes and
dissensuses normally provided by scientific or juridicial rigor, instead delegated to the
reflexes of algorithmic operations without necessary scrutiny. Such a critique falls also
in line with an elaboration of “datalogical turn” [15] as the modern epistemic shift
from traditional sociology to computational social sciences, whereby “representation
and its reliance on sociological correlation and correlative datasets” is superseded
by algorithms that “seek to prehend incomputable data and thereby modulate the
emergent forms of sociality in their emergence” [15]. Here, whereas “representation”
implies an iterative and subjective critique of evidence, the algorithmic capacity to
“prehend” suggests a removal of human deliberation and interpretability for the sake
of reflexive immediacy in a “regime of action.” Therefore, the function of identifying an
algorithmic govermentality or a datalogical turn is not to dismiss algorithms entirely
on ethical or nostalgic grounds, but to scrutinize how algorithmic operations enable
a suspension of criticality as well as concomitant strategies of behavior control.
2.1.1 Three Stages
Rouvroy and Berns describe three “stages” of algorithmic governmentality that exem-
plify how algorithmic operations affect the behavior of subjects and are rationalized
in doing so: data collection, processing, and application. As opposed to indexing dis-
crete strata of algorithmic governmentality, these stages characterize “blurred” types
of algorithmic techniques that, altogether, “are actually all the more effective because
they are blurred” [82]. Here, “blurred” means that algorithmic processes across data
collection, processing, and application are interactional and entangled, and therefore
that they do not lend themselves to decisive deconstruction, taxonomization, or in-
terpretation. Yet, the function of describing algorithmic governmentality according
to successive stages is to demonstrate that it is not specific algorithm designs or oper-
ations that enable algorithmic governmentality, but rather paradigms of algorithmic
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use that influence how algorithms are interpreted or obfuscated. Therefore, individu-
ally and holistically, the stages can be read to imply a dimension of semiotics, which
here concerns the perception and construction of algorithmic meanings by subjects.
Considered in this way, algorithmic governmentality becomes less a consequence of
algorithmic operations than an effect of how these operations are articulated and
perceived. This perspective will be examined in more detail in the following section.
2.1.1.1 Data Collection
Despite popular discourse that treats data as natural and prior to human design [74,
78, 2], data cannot exist without human intervention. Following from Johanna
Drucker’s proposal to redefine “data,” or that which is given, as “capta,” or that
which is captured [27], data have no intrinsic form and are rather seized and wrought
according to technical constraints and designed objective-driven imperatives [61]. Yet,
characteristic to algorithmic governmentality is a conceptualization of data as exactly
the opposite: an inherent, passive, and a-political aggregation of traces that exist
naturally in the world, prior to human intervention. For Rouvroy and Berns, this
inherently positivistic viewpoint enables algorithmic governmentality to collect data
about subjects without their scrutiny.
Rouvroy and Berns attribute the permissibility of data collection to the fact that
initially collected or “raw” data is fundamentally dispersed and prefigurative [82].
Initially “devoid of any prediction about specific end uses,” data are “perfectly in-
nocuous [and] can remain anonymous” in the way that their collection bears no imme-
diate consequences for subjects. Moreover “they also appear as absolutely ordinary
and scattered,” more easily interpreted as atomic traces than explicitly designed or
coherent representations. Thus “It follows that we are quite readily give [data] up,
for they bear no meaning” insofar as they have yet to be analyzed and operational-
ized. The a-signification of raw data is therefore key to enabling the permissibility of
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data collection: “Raw data do not resemble, nor keep even indirect physical bound
with any thing in the world, and they are not conventional symbols thereof either,”
and they “function as de-territorialized signals, inducing reflex responses in computer
systems, rather than signs carrying meanings and requiring interpretation” [83] Here,
“de-territorialized” refers to a quality of meaning that is not attached to any discrete
structuration of language or social codes, which is opposite to “re-territorialization”
or codification [23]. Therefore, algorithmic governmentality suggests that raw data
enable a departure from discrete meaning that is complicit in the rarefication of sub-
jectification.
Ultimately, what is enabled by data collection according to algorithmic govern-
mentality is a general obfuscation of the purposes of data, which for their part are
collected before they are made meaningful (i.e., re-territorialized). Such a conclu-
sion should be considered with due attention to the temporality and processuality of
data analysis [78], which enables data to pass prefiguratively and innocuously into
instrumentalization by algorithms ex post facto. To Rouvroy and Berns, this effect
culminates in the illusion of data as “traces left and not data shared, though they do
not seem to be ‘stolen,’” which suggests a circumvention of subjects and processes
of subjectification [82]. With respect to this last point, Rouvroy and Berns are es-
pecially adamant: “Together, all these factors eliminate or at least conceal any end
goal; they minimize the subject’s involvement, and therefore the consent which can be
required for this information sharing, thus removing all forms of intentionality.” Here,
the avoidance of “all forms of intentionality” in a regime of algorithmic governmental-
ity presents a more aggressive move than the “rarefication” of subjectification, which
might suggest a varied and heterogeneous relationship between specific algorithmic
techniques and accordant processes of subjectification.
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2.1.1.2 Data Processing
Data processing (also analysis, analytics) tends to begin with an assumption that
information inheres in and can be made to emerge from data [74, 78, 2]. Therefore,
data processing is a practice of not only experimentally drawing inferences from data
but also iteratively shaping these data so that they are commensurable and conducive
to analysis. Provided this flexibility, Rouvroy and Berns emphasize that inferences
produced by algorithmic data processing can be “uninformed by any pre-existing hy-
pothesis” and yet still operationalizable [82]. Louise Amoore and Volha Piotukh [2]
identify the same pattern with respect to “knowledge discovery,” which characterizes
a set of algorithmic techniques that automatically generate statistical inferences from
large swaths of heterogeneous data variables. Amoore and Piotukh describe how
knowledge discovery is motivated less by the intrinsic value of relationships between
data variables than by statistical confidence and commensurability. They stage this
paradigm with a memorable analogy: if big data is the inert substrate that data an-
alytics crystallizes into information, then “little analytics” is the partial lens through
which data is rendered valuable, although inauthentic to its totality. Therefore, for
both Rouvroy and Berns and Amoore and Piotukh, the truism that “correlation is
not causation” is incidentally dismissed by algorithms that can derive value from
operationalizing correlations irrespective of their veracity.
Correspondingly, Rouvroy and Berns describe that automation contributes to the
permissibility of data analytic inferences, which can be operationalized without hu-
man intervention. But what is more is that how these inferences are determined or
operationalized can be determined by algorithms as well. Rouvroy and Berns sug-
gest that “The purpose of what is called machine learning is ultimately to directly
enable the production of hypotheses based on the data themselves” [82], which im-
plicates the role of self-designing algorithms in further removing human judgment
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from the jurisdiction of algorithmic operations. Indeed, whereas an algorithm auto-
mates data processing, a machine learning algorithm automates how data processing
is designed. This feature is significant to Rouvroy and Berns because it suggests a
further expulsion of subjects from decision-making in an era of algorithmic govern-
mentality. Rather than enabling an alarmist stance toward the lack of human control
in a regime of “artificial intelligence,” this focus on machine learning might help to
identify exactly what kinds of control are forfeited to algorithmic automations, and
to what extent this is justifiable. Altogether—and this is essential—machine learning
algorithms do not operate exclusively without human oversight, but they do pardon
human involvement at certain points in data processing practice.
Ultimately, automation also entails a practice of generalization that undergirds the
operational logic of all algorithms. Although an algorithm might entail a sequence of
operations that is only executed one time, the value of algorithms in data processing is
that they can execute the same or similar operation for many data consecutively. As
an emergent result, data processing produces generalizations—generalization of one
operation to many data—which not only enable algorithmic governmentality to op-
erate but incidentally establish these operations as normative and inherent. Whereas
algorithms are called “biased” when their generalizations do not satisfy some statisti-
cal criteria [51], the generalizations afforded by the inherent biases of algorithms also
have a fundamental utility. They can be used to identify normative or anomalous
patterns in data, which reveals the relative value of data elements. However, this val-
uation of data incidentally marginalizes the relative biases of algorithms themselves.
Consequently, following from Rouvroy and Berns, “Norms seems to emerge directly
from reality itself” [82], even though they are shaped absolutely by the specific biases
of algorithms.1
1For more on this see Ned Rossiter’s “determination of relevance” [79], Alexander Galloway’s “pro-
tocological control” [38], Maurizio Lazzarato’s “economy of the possible” [59], Tiziana Terranova’s
“network dynamics” [94], Geoffrey Bowker’s “practical politics” [11], or Michel Serres “parasite” [88],
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2.1.1.3 Data Application
The final stage of algorithmic governmentality concerns how data, once collected and
processed by algorithms, is applied to subjects. As said, Rouvroy and Berns propose
that these data and inferences can be applied to statistical “doubles” instead of to
subjects directly, in such a way that “they cannot perceive it, but it is nevertheless
applied to them” [82]. The function of a “profile” here is essential, because it is the
computational representation of an individual subject that can be altered without a
subject’s awareness, and yet has direct implications for the subject’s conduct. Mod-
eled to reflect a subject’s “preferences, intentions and propensities” [51], a profile is
especially important for algorithms to anticipate circumstances, whereby information
is saved in the present in order to act on it in the future. Such a pattern is the
impetus for policy regarding data retention or “oblivion,” which concerns whether
and to what extent data about subjects should be permanently kept or eventually
expired [9]. If an individual’s past actions are used to represent the nature of their
current conduct, then the possibility of self-determination and self-directed devia-
tion from the past is altogether diminished [78]; indeed, such a paradigm entails the
rarefication of subjectification.
Importantly, Rouvroy and Berns find the specific circumstances of data application
to individual behaviors “less relevant” to a theorization of algorithmic governmental-
ity [82]. This move could be due to the fact that, if algorithmic governmentality
depends on the rarefication of subjectification, then a theory of algorithmic govern-
mentality is altogether less applicable to a stage of data application to individuals,
which might certainly involve more subjective deliberation than during data collec-
tion and processing. To an extent, this explanation is evidenced by the fact that
Rouvroy and Berns are keen to emphasize particular scenarios of data application
some of which will be returned to below.
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that might circumvent subjective reflection entirely, like direct, immediate “action
based on the anticipation of individual behaviors [which] could in the future be in-
creasingly limited to an intervention on their environment [and] which is already the
case at least during the significant part of life that individuals spend online” [82].
Indeed, this emphasis on the potential of algorithms to modulate environments and
interfaces directly strategically circumscribes where data application might be seen
to bypass subjectification entirely. Incidentally, this scope sidelines the involvement
of representation and subjective reflection in articulating the inferences of algorithms
to subjects in a stage of data application.
In addition, Rouvroy and Berns explicitly differentiate between, on the one hand,
data application to subjects that might involve their awareness, and on the other,
outcomes of data application which need not involve subjectification altogether, like
knowledge production. Specifically, they emphasize a difference between “information
at [the] individual level, on the one hand, which more often than not is observable
or perceptible by the individual concerned, and on the other hand, the knowledge
produced through the profiling” [82]. That is, a distinction is made here between the
actional application of algorithmic inferences to subjects (e.g., by physically changing
their behavior) and the systematic, usually prefigurative and anticipatory designa-
tion of individual subjects to their inferred profiles (e.g., “as a potential fraudster, a
consumer, a potential terrorist, a student with high potential, etc.” [82]—note the em-
phasis on potentiality). In doing so, Rouvroy and Berns suggest that data application
can happen as a form of knowledge production without actually being applied to sub-
jects. This move warrants focused consideration because it raises questions about how
this produced knowledge is ultimately articulated, whether to subjects of algorithmic
governmentality or to its operators. If data application is a matter of knowledge
production, then how is the knowledge articulated and perceived once produced?
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Is subjectification yet involved? These questions are important because they provi-
sionally implicate additional techniques—as well as representations—of algorithmic
governmentality that are not implicated by Rouvroy and Berns. Nevertheless, these
additional techniques would not necessarily refute the rarefication of subjectification
concerned.
Altogether, each stage of algorithmic governmentality exemplifies how algorithmic
operations can be used to know about, to make inferences about, and to act upon (or
to act on behalf of) subjects without their active involvement. And when the stages
are combined these effects are compounded: “their normative functioning is rendered
especially powerful and processual by the fact that they mutually reinforce one an-
other (further concealing end uses, further reducing any possibility of intentionality,
adapting to our own reality even more, etc.)” [82]. Rouvroy and Berns propose that
algorithmic governmentality is thus differentiable from the Foucauldian tradition of
governmentality and regimes of truth—Rouvroy contends that algorithmic logic “does
not need to go through any ordeal, any investigation, or any exam” in order to be
operationalized in practice, which sets it apart from truth established according to
“institutions and devices that engaged individuals” [84]. In turn, this “regime of ac-
tion” obfuscates the purpose of raw data, the difference between real uncertainty and
algorithmic probability, and indeed the inherence of algorithmic governmentality in
operationalized algorithmic systems, all the while diminishing the possibility of their
critique.
2.2 Algorithmic Semiotics
Semiotics, which concerns the study of how meaning is produced, interpreted, and
communicated, can be viewed as fundamental dimension of the critique staged by
algorithmic governmentality. For instance, we see the semiotics of algorithmic gov-
ernmentality implicated throughout its three stages: the a-signification of raw data
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enables their collection (data collection), digital behaviorism and the datalogical turn
implicate an epistemological shift away from representation (data processing), and
knowledge produced via profiling is not “observable or perceptible by the individual
concerned” [82] (data application). Most significantly, the rarefication of subjectifi-
cation proposed by algorithmic governmentality also implies a rarefication of signifi-
cation: algorithmic operations elude subjects, contemplation, and critique when they
are not directly expressed to them. Considered together, each of these points sug-
gests that algorithmic governmentality implicates a semiotics that privileges the role
of a-signification in avoiding subjects [83]. This claim is consistent with the above
assessment of data application’s scope: algorithmic governmentality is keen to em-
phasize patterns of behavior control that involve immediate and unmediated actions
on subjects, when in fact many of these actions might entail layers of representations,
significations, or subjective reflections.
Altogether, it would be valuable to consider the particular mechanisms and rep-
resentations through which algorithmic operations are signified to subjects, whether
through designed explanations of algorithms (e.g., visualizations), or through ac-
cidental expressions of algorithmic operations that emerge from their failure (e.g.,
algorithmic infrastructures that become visible when they break down [90]). Such
an approach would not challenge a theory of algorithmic governmentality so much
as complicate its dependencies on a-signification—or systems of meaning that elude
decisive human interpretation—like those of dispersed raw data, automatic machine
learning algorithms, and removed statistical doubles. What is at particular stake
here is a marginalization of the role of signification in algorithmic governmentality,
which risks viewing algorithms and their influence as entailing an inaccessible and
impenetrable regime of top-down behavior control.
In many ways, this problem resembles academic discourse surrounding “black
boxes,” a metaphor cited frequently in critical algorithm studies to characterize the
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leverage that algorithms have over their subjects due to the invisibility of their
logic [43]. That algorithms can make and operationalize inferences about subjects,
all the while without making their logic visible or legible, is the impetus for “open-
ing the black box,” “reverse engineering” it [26], or decrying proprietary algorithmic
systems [70]. As useful as a black box metaphor is for identifying that algorithmic
systems can exercise control over their subjects without their seeing it, this critique
fundamentally attributes the power of algorithms to their invisibility and inaccessi-
bility. Incidentally, this emphasis comes at the expense of considering how algorithms
produce knowledge and are rationalized even when they are not absolutely invisible. In
particular, whereas the black box metaphor might be criticized for failing to account
for the dynamic complexity of algorithmic systems and their diverse relationships to
socio-technical assemblages (e.g., algorithm developers, users, applications) [43], it
also neglects the importance of the designed representations and significations that
come to stand in for this opaque complexity, which represent it as innocuous, benign,
or imbue it with human-interpretable meaning.
For their part, Rouvroy and Berns implicate other features of algorithms besides
invisibility that lend to their effects and power, and therefore algorithmic govern-
mentality is not reductive like the black box metaphor. For this reason, the theory’s
emphasis on avoiding signification is not problematic as much as it is strategically
extreme: it implicates the latent potentiality of algorithms to avoid subjects and rar-
efy subjectification. Indeed, the most absolute or ‘late’ manifestations of algorithmic
governmentality might be expected to be absolutely invisible to its subjects, circum-
venting subjectification entirely. However, considering how the theory avoids subjects
by avoiding signification raises the question of how significations of algorithms are
nonetheless implicated in their rationalization.
Addressing this question comprehensively, Ned Rossiter proposes a theory of “lo-
gistical media” [79] that identifies the role of algorithmic, digital, and material media
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in processes that coordinate labor. In particular, Rossiter emphasizes attending to the
aesthetics and semiotics of work management interfaces, like visualizations of work
performance metrics, that not only direct labor according to algorithms, but also
shape how laborers interpret themselves according to these algorithmic interfaces [80]
(this might be compared to the control and self-control of governmentality, respec-
tively). When these logistical media are operationalized to determine the placement of
people and property according to algorithmic parameters and procedures, they also
lend themselves to human observation and reflection. For Rossiter, such percepts
may in turn lend themselves to identifying logistical fault lines or chokepoints around
which new political subjectivities can be developed: logistical media becomes a plane
of political contestation when the knowledge it produces or rationalizes is contested.
Logistical media theory thus raises the question: what media render algorithms to
human interpretation and rationalization?
Rossiter proceeds in collaboration with Soenke Zehle [107] to implicate the role of
algorithmic systems in obfuscating laborers’ perceptions of their working conditions.
Rossiter and Soenke Zehle identify that, whereas historical threats to laborers such as
machinic automation were identifiable, describable, and translatable into organized
modes of discourse and resistance, the semiotics of algorithmic information systems
confound these more traditional conceptualizations and articulations of labor, pre-
venting their contestation. In particular, Rossiter and Zehle call specific attention to
how the simplicity of work interfaces in Uber and Amazon Mechanical Turk contra-
dict the platforms’ actually very intricate reformulations of labor. In doing so, the
Uber and Amazon Mechanical Turk interfaces effectively depart from a “black box”
paradigm of concealing algorithms in order to rationalize them, and turn instead to
what might be called a “white box”2 paradigm: they enlist intuitive representations
2In cybernetics and information theory, a white box is model designed to represent an unknown
“black box” process—if the white box can be designed such that it exhibits the same functionality
as the black box, then the two processes can be considered “isomorphic” and practically the same,
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of algorithmic systems that incidentally divert attention from the complexities of
algorithmic processes. Although the representations of the white boxes are clarify-
ing and altogether isomorphic to the actual processes of black boxes, they are not
any more transparent; accordingly, they may obfuscate the ulterior functionalities of
algorithms.
Therefore, whereas algorithmic governmentality is typified by algorithms that by-
pass signification to avoid subjects, Rossiter and Zehle imply that the total enclosure
and autonomy of algorithms is not necessary for an algorithmic governmentality to
unfold. At the cusp of this contention is Maurizio Lazzarato’s explication [59] of
Félix Guattari’s “mixed” semiotics, which concerns for Lazzarato, tersely put, how
computational information systems produce meanings for subjects. For algorithmic
governmentality, the importance of this theory is to chart a movement away from sub-
jectification per governmentality proper, and toward a new paradigm of information
systems that produces knowledge and subjects. However, following from logistical
media theory, I contend that mixed semiotics is better equipped to understanding
that rationalizations of algorithmic operations depend not only on the automatic
black boxes of algorithms, but also on their imbrications with clarifying and reflec-
tive white boxes. Here, I elaborate mixed semiotics according to human-computer
interaction (HCI) paradigms, in order to demonstrate what the theory entails for un-
derstanding, studying, and designing information systems. Following this description,
I return to the three stages of algorithmic governmentality in light of mixed semiotics,
and provide a series of examples in order to illustrate how these theories connect.
2.2.1 Mixed Semiotics
Traditionally, human-computer interaction (HCI) conceptualizes interactions between
users and information systems as involving a dialogue or volley between users and
even if their inhering mechanisms are different.
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information systems: users provide instructions to information systems that are in
turn relayed back to users as “feedback.” This model also conceptualizes information
systems as tools—even in the case of wearable technologies these systems are con-
ceived as prostheses. The same notion applies to human-centered computing (HCC),
which focuses especially on “usability” and “ergonomics” paradigms in order to design
interactions that suit users. For example, the famous human-computer interaction
touchstone “The Design of Everyday Things” [68] encourages design that is intuitive,
responsive, and does not overwhelm users with extraneous information. Therefore,
in the context of human-computer interaction (HCI), mixed semiotics departs from a
conceptualization of computer interaction as involving a dialogue between users and
information systems, as well as a conceptualization of information systems as tools. It
accomplishes this in four primary ways which are described as follows, each of which
has direct implications for rationalizations of algorithms. Altogether, these dynamics
are illustrative and should not be taken as a universal model of meaning, but rather
as a “metamodel” [40] that reveals certain relationships and can be set aside once
used.
Firstly, because mixed semiotics is a post-structuralist or “critical” semiotics [42],
it aims not so much to determine which signifiers produce certain meanings or entail
certain referents (like a structuralist Sausserian or pragmatic Peircean semiotics), but
rather to identify how meanings are socially constructed. With respect to human-
computer interaction, this encourages interpreting information systems not according
to the content or meanings that interfaces present to users, but according to how this
presented meaning was constructed by multiple actors and algorithmic processes. Ac-
cordingly, a concomitant function of mixed semiotics is to identify how constructed
meanings engender certain power dynamics. That is, if information systems can pro-
duce knowledge, then they can also influence their users according to this knowledge.
Lazzarato likens this pattern to an “economy of the possible” [59] which characterizes
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systems of meaning that define and constrain possible human actions and behaviors,
whether according to the knowledge produced by categorical identities (e.g., race,
political affiliation) or by information systems.
Secondly, and accordingly, mixed semiotics suggests that interactions between
users and information systems cannot be interpreted exclusively in the terms of
structuralist semiotics like linguistics. That is, although information systems may
use language to convey meanings to their users, information systems also use non-
linguistic representations (e.g., visualizations of data points) to convey meaning. In
order to illustrate this, mixed semiotics invents the hypothetical categories of “signi-
fying semiotics” and “a-signifying semiotics,” and likens them to linguistic meanings
and “machinic” meanings, respectively. The purpose of doing this is not to suggest
that machines can understand meaning (as in artificial intelligence), but to indicate
that not all meanings can be deconstructed according to human-interpretable gram-
mars and syntaxes. For example, Patricio Davila [20] likens a-signifying semiotics to
Gestalt principles in data visualization, which characterize visual relationships among
data elements that indicate meanings to users pre-attentively, without recourse to lan-
guage. Such a non-linguistic and pre-attentive articulation of meaning is one property
of a-signifying semiotics.
Thirdly, mixed semiotics suggests that constructed meanings are never stable but
always in flux and “mixed” into broader regimes of meaning. It emphasizes the proces-
suality and concoction of signifying and a-signifying semiotics, which are constantly
being formed (i.e., territorialized) and de-formed (i.e., de-territorialized) according
to systems of meaning and their digression over time. With respect to information
systems, for example, the de-territorialized, a-signifying semiotics of raw data may be
re-territorialized in the form of human-readable data tables. Therefore, a-signifying
semiotics are not so much opposite to signifying semiotics as much as they are atomic
constituents or building blocks that ultimately give way to signifying semiotics, or are
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dissolved out of them [49]. Thus mixed semiotics is supposed to characterize a dy-
namic processuality instead of a fixed taxonomy of meaning. In the context of mixed
semiotics, therefore, “regime” means “a system or planned way of doing things” [46]
that can be contested. This suggests, for example, that information systems can cen-
tripetally structurate a system of meaning into a meaningful “focal point” [59] that is
presented to users, but any number of fragmented meanings can be derived from it.
In this way, rationalizations of algorithms can be understood as never totally inherent
or stable but in a state of constant contestation and negotiation.
Lastly, mixed semiotics suggests that human interactions with a-signifying semi-
otics engender a special paradigm of meaning-making called “machinic enslavement”.3
Machinic enslavement can be meaningfully compared to Theodor Adorno’s descrip-
tion of radio as an art of enslavement enabled by “atomized listening” [1]: both
theories concern a regime of human behavior mediated by “atomized” interactions
with media. For mixed semiotics these atomized interactions come in the form of
de-territorialized, a-signifying semiotics. To Lazzarato [59], machinic enslavement
opposes a “tool-inspired model” of information systems as human prostheses in favor
of a conceptualization of information systems that generate “modes of enunciation
that do not originate in the individuated subject.” This effectively implicates the
functions of data, algorithms, and interfaces in affecting human behavior according
to intricate computational abstractions: “In a machine-centric world, in order to
3Because “enslavement” has fervently dystopian connotations, it is worth noting here that Guat-
tari, who coined the term, likened machinic enslavement to the less iniquitous example of driving
a car, and he implied the emancipatory potential of a-signifying semiotics: Guattari rejected “anti-
modern and anti-machine recapitulations of humanism” that feared a concession of discrete social
categories to the fragmented meanings of computation [41]. This principle of Guattari’s should be
understood in light of his general philosophy and metaphysics, which proposed “molecular” [49], “rhi-
zomatic” [23], and “schizoanalytic” epistemologies that denounced hierarchical regimes of meaning.
In contrast, machinic enslavement might also be seen to inform Gilles Deleuze’s notion of “dividuals,”
which famously characterized a regime of behavior control according to de-territorialized or atomized
algorithmic inferences that “sieve” individuals [22]. However, especially with respect to Guattari,
machinic enslavement should not be read as a problem or a threat, but rather as a paradigm or
model of human-computer interaction.
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speak, see, smell, and act, we are of a piece with machines and asignifying semiotics.”
Machinic enslavement thus characterizes how human-computer interactions can ratio-
nalize algorithms by rendering their operations as immediate, whereby the meanings
of algorithms appear inherent or are interpreted pre-attentively.
2.2.2 Return to Three Stages
Following from this explication of mixed semiotics, Rouvroy and Berns suggest that
a-signifying semiotics enable strategies of governance differentiable from subjectifica-
tion: as opposed to privileging the “representative functions” [82] of language that
lend themselves in turn to discourse and reflexive subjects, a-signifying semiotics
“synchronize and modulate the pre-individual and pre-verbal elements of subjectiv-
ity by causing the affects, perceptions, emotions, etc. to function like component
parts” [59], via machinic enslavement.4 Therefore, mixed semiotics has purchase for
Rouvroy and Berns because it emphasizes that subjectification in an era of algorith-
mic governmentality is changed drastically by the properties of algorithms, which can
be considered from this semiotic vantage: given that algorithms can operate with-
out lending themselves to human interpretation or signifying semiotics, a-signifying
semiotics are increasingly important in an era of algorithmic governmentality.
On the other hand, Rossiter and Zehle [107] invoke mixed semiotics in order to
consider how mixed signifying and a-signifying semiotics interact to produce mean-
ings for subjects, without setting their sights exclusively on machinic enslavement.
Indeed, that a-signifying semiotics interact with signifying semiologies in Guattari’s
model—that they are “mixed” together—suggests that a theory of algorithmic gov-
ernmentality could benefit from a consideration of how mixed a-signifying and sig-
nifying semiotics interact in order to lend algorithms to human interpretation. As
4Lazzarato [59] also uses terms like “proto-subjectivities” and “proto-enunciations” in order to
illustrate this. These terms illustrate that, respectively, the subjective identities and linguistic
enunciations of signifying semiotics are fragmented when they are articulated through a-signifying
semiotics.
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said, whereas machinic enslavement reflects the capabilities of a-signifying semiotics
to affect human judgment pre-attentively, a-signifying semiotics are enmeshed with
and “always in the process of being recuperated by a signifying semiology” [49]. Al-
gorithms, for example, elude subjects via a-signification and yet are recuperated in
the form of human-readable data tables (e.g., “heart rate data”), the proper names
of algorithms (e.g., “T-SNE” [63]), or categorical identities of data subjects (e.g.,
“good student”). To consider mixed semiotics with respect to algorithmic govern-
mentality, therefore, is to acknowledge the rarefication of subjectification and yet
to question whether this trend entails a total departure from signification. For this
task, we can return to the three stages of algorithmic governmentality in order to
provisionally identify how algorithmic governmentality is enabled not only by signifi-
cations in human-interpretable media but also by interactions between signifying and
a-signifying semiotics.
2.2.2.1 Data Collection
Data collection entails a fundamentally black boxed process that operates in the
‘background’ of computational platforms like web browsers, mobile applications, and
credit card transactions. Accordingly, algorithmic governmentality emphasizes that
data collection enables an avoidance of subjects, especially when data is collected
without an individual’s awareness or active contemplation. However, it is also valu-
able to consider the role of representation and signification in rationalizing these
collections altogether. That is, although the collection of personal data tends to
float largely under our radar, as it were, this process and its effects may also make
themselves known and interpretable in ways that have recourse to intuitive, signify-
ing semiotics. Furthermore, whereas the implication of data collection in algorithmic
governmentality is that data can be repurposed to any end after it is already col-
lected, we might consider how data collection is rationalized in other ways; that is, as
26
opposed to concealing from subjects how data will be used. Such rationalizations of
data collection are not limited to obfuscatory “Terms of Service Agreements” (which
are for their part hardly human-interpretable), and rather especially include scenar-
ios of data collection in which the data concerned is produced or created by actively
participating subjects.
Rouvroy and Berns address that user interactions with social media “are full of
signifying semiotics” to the extent that “many people have become obsessed with
producing subjectivity” [82]. The implication here—and usually the implication of
Guattarian signifying semiotics in general—is that signifying semiotics lend them-
selves to immersive, visceral, and reified meanings that may altogether be inauthen-
tic to some ulterior functionality (or power dynamics). That is, for social media, the
human-interpretable and subject-oriented signifying semiotics of being a user with
a certain number of ‘followers’ or ‘likes’ give way to systems of meaning and con-
comitant behaviors that reinforce the values of these meanings; simultaneously, these
signifying terms mean nothing to algorithms that collect data about them insofar as
they deal exclusively with patterns among this data and their a-signifying semiotics.
Therefore, Rouvroy and Berns’s invocation of social media incidentally suggests how
signifying semiotics can enable data collection in algorithmic governmentality to pass
innocuously, by concealing the backgrounded functionality of collecting data about
interactions with these signifying systems of meaning. This (white box) conceptual-
ization of data collection should be set alongside the prior (black box) one, according
to which data collection is permissible because data is dispersed, prefigurative, and
without a definitive purpose. Indeed, both signifying and a-signifying dimensions of
data collection may comprise the same information systems.
In surveillance studies, Julie Cohen [16] characterizes this pattern of data collec-
tion that requires participation from subjects as evidencing a “participatory turn” in
surveillance, according to which innocuous tasks of crowd-sourcing mask their ulterior
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agendas of data collection. Cohen notes in particular the media ecology of Nike+ for
representing data collection attractively, specifically by implementing “gamification”
in wearable technologies to overshadow the importance of data collected for targeted
marketing. Cohen also calls attention to Foursquare as a valorized “map for noth-
ing” [31], which gives its users the opportunity to add anything about their lives to
a shareable geography, which consequently collects this data for investors to access
and use. In both cases, signifying semiotics are implicated in a process that Cohen
pithily characterizes as “playing and being played,” by which subjects deal exclusively
in entertaining, intuitive, and innocuous systems of meaning that lend themselves to
ulterior functions of data collection.
Whereas Rouvroy and Berns note how algorithmic governmentality can be ratio-
nalized “under cover of ‘personalizing’ information” [82], Cohen’s Foursquare example
further implicates how this “cover” can leverage signifying semiotics. Particularly, as
opposed to representing data collection directly, Foursquare represents data collec-
tion according to what Cohen notes is a diegetic gameplay experience. Accordingly,
Cohen likens the diegetic and non-diegetic in games to the subjects and operators
of gamified surveillance environments, respectively. That is, whereas the subjects
of gamification act within the seamless, immersive, and consistent constraints of a
gameplay narrative, operators acknowledge that the non-diegetic game environment
enables conditions of action that are bounded within a controlled system. It is such
that the participatory turn characterizes designing a narrative for the subjects of
data collection, which lets data collection pass in a way similar to that proposed by
algorithmic governmentality. However, the diegetic gameplay experience further im-
plicates the role of signifying semiotics in rationalizing data collection: data is not
only dispersed and prefigurative—it is contemporaneously territorialized in the form
of Foursquare locations that users create and interact with.
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Furthermore, the participatory turn entails a broader rationalization of data col-
lection according to what Cohen terms the “surveillance–innovation complex”: an
ideological symbiosis of agendas for data collection and imperatives for technological
innovation, in which “participation and commodification are entwined as a matter
of political economy.” As opposed to simply enclosing data collection processes in a
black box, the surveillance–innovation complex engenders a new political subjectivity
that privileges the value of “crowd-sourcing” and “open data” in enabling a prosper-
ous economy and society. Therefore, in addition to Nike+ and Foursquare, Cohen
describes how information policy legislation underscores a rhetoric of “information
processing as innovation,” whereby data innovation, openness, and autonomy is put
in opposition to government regulation, which is said to suppress innovation. That
these trends might be read as technoscientific variations of neoliberalism suggests
that subjectivity indeed has a significant part to play in rationalizing algorithmic
approaches to data collection and processing.
The surveillance–innovation complex can be compared to algorithmic govern-
mentality in that both critiques enable a shift away from deconstructing the mixed
semiotics of interfaces—as in machinic enslavement and gameplay diegesis—and to-
ward interpreting broader, epistemological rationalizations enabled by mixed semi-
otic regimes. This is to view mixed semiotics as, on the one hand, ‘mixed’ at the
level of interfaces, algorithms, visualizations, and games, and on the other, consis-
tent in enabling a broader algorithmic rationality that is not instantiated in code
and yet manifests in discursive, diagrammatic, and indeed legislative articulations of
algorithms. Although this distinction risks dichotomizing and reifying how a mixed
semiotic framework should be applied, it is useful because it prevents reducing mixed
semiotics to a map of the material architectures of algorithmic systems. In other
words, signifying and a-signifying semiotics should not be exclusively understood
as, respectively, the visible ‘front-ends’ and algorithmic ‘back-ends’ of computational
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‘stacks’; instead, computational semiotics also interact with broader socio-technical
assemblages that are manifest in other mixed semiotics. This enables a departure
from a conceptualization of information systems as conveying meaning to users in an
isolated or ‘closed’ system.
Accordingly, considering data collection in light of mixed semiotics enables a con-
sideration of how broader social customs and cultural practices—for example, in the
form of “open data” legislation—enable data collection to pass permissibly through
the diegetic mixed semiotics of algorithmic interfaces. And such an insight is not op-
posed to a theory of algorithmic governmentality: that data are intrinsically dispersed,
prefigurative, and a-signifying may strengthen the capability of signifying semiotics
to relate this lack of territorialized meaning to permissible, enticing, or addictive data
collection narratives. At the same time, and as suggested by a surveillance–innovation
complex, we might further witness the emergence of new norms regarding which kinds
of these articulations are permissible themselves. Therefore, what is also important
to attend to here is how regimes of data collection are normalized over time or oth-
erwise disputed. For example, although data collection processes may not ask users
explicitly for permission to collect their data [98], this behavior is also being flagged
and contested as problematic [39]. Therefore, how this interaction paradigm is ratio-
nalized is not only a function of diegetic mixed semiotics in a closed system, but also
one of broader social norms and mixed semiotics.
2.2.2.2 Data Processing
Whereas data collection meets subjects at their smartphones or wearable devices, we
have insofar characterized data processing as the absolutely a-signifying, automatic,
and invisible logic of algorithms. And according to Rouvroy and Berns’s critique of
machine learning, even the design of this logic can be determined by black boxed
algorithms that escape subjective reflection and critique. Such an argument has
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its merits, specifically in acknowledging how algorithmic logic may be even more
permissible when it is opaque [60]. However, a focus on mixed semiotics encourages
us again to consider how data processing lends itself to various systems of meaning
that are not so easily characterized as ‘black’ or ‘white’: rationalizations of algorithms
depend not only on whether their operations are visible to users, but also, per mixed
semiotics, how these visibilities are constructed.
As established by the field of “visual analytics” [95], which concerns the interdisci-
plinary design and study of machine learning, human-computer interaction, and data
visualization, the need to render algorithms and their operations intuitively and ac-
cessibly is heightened by the increasing complexity of their functions and inferences.
In particular, even though machine learning algorithms leverage information in data
to determine how to best operationalize it, this process is itself highly supervised and
controlled by users, at least according to human-interpretable statistics about how
these algorithms satisfy some statistical performance criteria (classifier precision or
recall are fundamental examples). Accordingly, visual analytics is one particularly di-
rect means of rendering data processing for human interpretation and use. Although
visual analytics is examined extensively later in this study, it is worth noting here
that the explicit object of visual analytics is not to rationalize algorithms, but to lend
them more accessibly to human interpretation. Therefore, we will later examine how
this directive may nonetheless rationalize algorithmic operations.
On the other hand, Christian Sandvig [86] implicates the function of visual, soni-
cal, and even theatrical representations of algorithms in rationalizing data processing
operations according to enticing abstractions. Sandvig calls attention to metaphors of
data processing—an animated assembly line that explains Google Search (Figure 1), a
vintage industrial machine that represents Facebook EdgeRank (Figure 2)—for shap-
ing appraisals of algorithmic systems according to connotations of comprehensiveness
and objectivity. The reader will note that these metaphors rationalize post-industrial
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ecologies in the image of mundane Fordist paradigms, which is remarkably consis-
tent with Rossiter and Zehle’s critique of Uber and Amazon Mechanical Turk. With
respect to mixed semiotics, a caricature of an algorithmic system as an industrial ma-
chine leverages signifying semiotics to rationalize the intricate logics, dynamics, and
design considerations of algorithms. Similarly, Sandvig implies that the definition of
“algorithm” is indeterminate, and more a function of its collective representations in
diagrams, advertisements, and metaphors. Indeed this would have it that the very
definition of “algorithm” is one of mixed semiotics. Therefore, when Sandvig calls for
a “counter-visuality” that would represent algorithms in different, non-visual terms,
he appeals to the contestation of this mixed semiotic regime.
If rationalizations of data collection can occur both at the level of interfaces (e.g.,
diegetic games) and at the level of political discourse (e.g., the surveillance–innovation
complex), then rationalizations of data processing are not restricted to representing
algorithms through interfaces either. Rossiter and Zehle [107] explain how Walmart
rationalizes its algorithmic operationalization of labor according to “social physics,”
which frames data analytics of labor performance as an objective science. Social
physics [71] is a mathematical abstraction of interactions among crowds that pro-
poses the development of infrastructure and information systems according to spe-
cific measures of crowd dynamics. In the way that it is applied by Walmart, social
physics is exemplary of a mixed semiotic regime that structurates meaning according
to abstractions, and is used in turn to rationalize algorithmic data processing. Like
the surveillance–innovation complex, and very much unlike games or visualizations,
social physics does not explain how algorithms work so much as it licenses a rational-
ity of using algorithms. Following from mixed semiotics, we can interpret this regime
of meaning as something that is sometimes territorialized into information systems,
advertisements, or labor policy, or is otherwise contested.
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Figure 1: The Google Search algorithm represented as an animated assembly line
(designed by [45], excerpt by [86]).
Figure 2: The Facebook EdgeRank algorithm represented as an industrial machine
(designed by [104], excerpt by [86]).
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2.2.2.3 Data Application
Whether data application can occur without subjectification or signification is ques-
tionable. Even in the case that data application produces knowledge about subjects
without their awareness, the fact that this knowledge must eventually be interpreted,
used, or applied suggests that data application can never remain absolutely removed
from subjective interpretations. Granted, this may be one reason that Rouvroy and
Berns propose a “rarefication of subjectification” and not an absolute elimination of
subjectification. Indeed, such a complete avoidance of subjects from data application
is theoretically possible, but it would require a kind of ‘total’ machinic enslavement,
like one presaged by cyberneticians or technological determinists. Nonetheless, for
the time being we might attend to the ways in which data application is rationalized
by systems of meaning that are perceived by their subjects.
Initiating work in this direction already, Ganaele Langlois [57] applies mixed
semiotics to deconstructing the Amazon.com web interface, which reveals how the
a-signifying semiotics of algorithms mix with the signifying semiotics of interfaces in
order to construct coherent meanings for users. Amazon’s representation of books is
particularly interesting to Langlois, as they demonstrate case in point how the signi-
fying semiotics of book cover images, page contents, and pricing information integrate
with the a-signifying semiotics of how these books are defined programmatically in
data. In addition, Langlois calls attention to Amazon’s book recommendation sys-
tem, which algorithmically extrapolates similarities between user profiles in order to
suggest catalogs of books to users based on their interests. Whereas this system
evidences aspects of algorithmic governmentality, it also entails a mixed semiotics in
which the fragmented data of user profiles is territorialized into the cohesive signifying
semiotics of books that are “Recommended for you, Peter.” Indeed, that algorithms
compute book recommendations is trivial, but that these algorithmic processes are
meaningful according to subjective names, identities, and interests is a consideration
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enabled by mixed semiotics. Accordingly, Langlois’s application of mixed semiotics
to Amazon book recommendation exemplifies a paradigm of rationalizing algorithms
during a stage of ‘data application’ that does not avoid subjects, and in fact addresses
them directly.
However, recalling the relationship between diegetic mixed semiotics—like at the
level of interfaces—and broader mixed semiotic regimes—like at the level of political
identity, legislation, and discourse—it becomes clear that Langlois’s Amazon exam-
ple evidences a tendency toward the former. That is, although the study decisively
deconstructs the Amazon recommendation system according to the diegetic mixed
semiotics of Amazon’s web interfaces, less conspicuous in her study is how the mixed
semiotics of Amazon book recommendations are rationalized by systems of meaning
beyond the scope of diegesis, like interface aesthetics or interaction norms. An exam-
ple of this might include the fact that recommendation systems are typically evaluated
according to their faults, not only by their developers, but also increasingly by jour-
nalists, and victims of inappropriate or otherwise uncanny recommendations [3]. This
broader awareness or ‘literacy’ of the implications of recommendation systems can be
productively viewed as a mixed semiotic regime that compromises the stability of the
system of meaning manifest in Amazon book recommendation. Such is a function of
the mixed semiotics framework: to acknowledge that these systems of meaning, no
matter their instantiation in code, are constantly being upset and re-negotiated.
Another regime of meaning that influences the rationalization of algorithmic rec-
ommendation and information systems is one of aesthetics. To reiterate, “regime”
here means “a system or planned way of doing things” [46] that can be contested.
Therefore, to invoke aesthetics with respect to mixed semiotics follows most closely
to the work of Jacques Rancière [75], who proposes in a theory of “aisthesis” that
art should be characterized not by distinct phases of artistic genres and periods, but
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by evolving canon of aesthetic and representational invention which is being contin-
ually disrupted. Therefore, aesthetic regimes are being continually reinvented and
contested in a “distribution of the sensible.” How might this relate to rationalizations
of algorithms? Rossiter and Zehle [81] invoke “aisthesis” explicitly in describing an
“aesthetics of algorithmic experience,” which characterizes a similar paradigm of aes-
thetic regimes, but according to the human experience of living among algorithmic
representations and valuations of life. Examples of this already discussed include
social physics, as well as metaphors of algorithms as machines, both of which are
part of a collective regime of meaning—discursive and aesthetic—that rationalizes
the application of algorithms to subjects.
In this way, an aesthetics of algorithmic experience might be read altogether as an
aesthetics of algorithmic governmentality: how algorithmic governmentality is ratio-
nalized according the prevailing aesthetics of algorithm representations, applications,
and effects. Furthermore, in this way, even mundane representations of ‘data process-
ing’ and ‘data collection’ are implicated as aestheticizations of ‘data application’ and
algorithmic governmentality. Like Cohen, Rossiter and Zehle [81] note the media ecol-
ogy of Nike+ for its partial representation of algorithmic purposes and effects. The
two examples they cite are useful for illustrating how data application is rationalized
when it is aestheticized: whereas the in-store visualizations of the Nike+ running app
depict data collected from wearable devices in an organic 3D interface (Figure 3), the
data-driven statues of the Nike China Logistics Center represent energy savings and
logistical efficiency as animated LED displays (Figure 4). Therefore, whereas algorith-
mic governmentality traces a movement of rationalizing algorithms according to the
removal of subjects from algorithmic decision-making process, these examples suggest
an inclination to, nonetheless, rationalize these processes through highly visual and
subject-oriented aesthetic displays. For example, we might add to this list “beautiful”
visualizations of cybersecurity operations [65] (Figure 5) or algorithmic artworks as
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Figure 3: The Nike+ City Runs visualization (designed by [73]) depicts data collected
from wearable devices as an venous grid of geographic activity. The question raised by
Rossiter and Zehle is: how does this representation confer to a certain understanding
of data collection algorithms?
popularized by Google’s neural network “hallucination” projects [64], which bear no
interpretable meanings to public audiences and yet rationalize algorithmic operations
according to highly stylized a-signifying semiotics. The purpose of these aestheti-
cizations are to present algorithmic applications to the public, but not necessarily to
render these applications accessibly.
Through invoking Rancière in a similar manner to Rossiter and Zehle, Alexander
Galloway [36] contends that visualizations are, unlike art, constrained to a partic-
ular aesthetic regime. Galloway likens visualizations to a “banality of representa-
tion”—like the aesthetic compliment of Hannah Arendt’s banality of evil [4]—which
implicates computational “modes of production” for determining the representational
capabilities of visualizations. For example, beyond data points and graphs, there are
some non-quantitative aspects of data—e.g., how subjects experienced the process
of data collection—that visualizations are simply unable to represent. Therefore,
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Figure 4: LED displays (designed by [24], photographed by [25]) at the Nike China
Logistics Center aestheticize energy savings and logistical efficiency metrics.
Figure 5: The Daedalus cybersecurity visualization [65]. Although spheres appear to
represent networks and red pop-out glyphs cyberattacks, the visualization is unintel-
ligible to a public audience without insider knowledge, and is rather functional as an
aestheticization of cybersecurity operations.
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whereas Galloway sides with Rancière, Rossiter, and Zehle to acknowledge how vi-
sualizations entail a “distribution of the sensible” [75], Galloway pushes back on the
opportunism that a new aesthetic regime can happen on behalf of artistic ingenuity
alone. In this way, Galloway implicates the effects of computational materiality on
representational and aesthetic possibilities. Alongside an aesthetics of algorithmic ex-
perience, this together depicts the total rationalization of algorithms as an evolving
“aisthesis” that is yet constrained by the representational capabilities of visualiza-
tions. Therefore, if an algorithmic “regime of action” [82] exists, it is continually
rationalized by algorithm aesthetics and concurrently constrained by their modes of
production.
Altogether, somewhat unlike for data processing, representations of data appli-
cation are less concerned with the logic, procedurality, and functionality of algo-
rithms than with the implications of algorithms for human experience. To be sure,
data collection, processing, and application are artificial categories imposed here for
the sake of illustration—they are “blurred”—but segmenting them in this way helps
to move from algorithmic games to algorithmic visualizations to algorithm aesthet-
ics, the latter of which characteristically avoid representing the materiality of algo-
rithms [81]—e.g., whether logistical efficiency at the Nike China Logistics Center is
achieved by optimization algorithms, labor policies, both, or neither—in order to ar-
ticulate the vague epistemic rationality of an “algorithmic culture” [92]. And yet, this
departure from materiality does not yield a total black box; instead, what substitutes
a depiction of algorithmic logic (i.e., data processing) is a vibrant and persuasive
show of algorithmic effects (i.e., data application). This implicates an aesthetics of




Following from a theory of algorithmic governmentality, we identified how properties
of algorithms and their data enable the rationalization of algorithmic inferences, es-
pecially in a way that diminishes opportunities for critique and subjective reflection.
We described data collection, processing, and application as “blurred” algorithmic
techniques that evidence aspects of algorithmic governmentality, which consequently
implied the function of semiotics in rationalizations of algorithms. Then, according
to the mixed semiotics framework, we characterized rationalizations of algorithms as
systems of meaning that reify algorithmic inferences, whether according to human-
interpretable representations of algorithms (i.e., signifying semiotics) or real-time
human-computer interactions with algorithmic systems (i.e., a-signifying semiotics).
We identified gamification, visualization, and book recommendation as instantiating
diegetic mixed semiotics in this way, and we described how appeals to innovation,
metaphorization, and aestheticization engender broader mixed semiotic regimes.
To be clear, operating algorithms in real time through visual interfaces does not
refute the possibility of algorithmic governmentality nor its rarefication of subjectifi-
cation. In fact, the participation of analysts in operationalizing algorithms does not
include the actual subjects of algorithmic governmentality, but rather its operators.
And yet, this caveat raises the question about who the subjects of algorithmic govern-
mentality include—presumably the subjects of algorithmic governmentality are the
individuals about whom data is collected and applied—but are algorithm operators
and analysts not a kind of subject as well? Altogether, as is made most evident by
the “quantified self” [93] and “personal genomics” [53] movements, this distinction
between algorithmic subjects and operators is beginning to blur—very much like the
stages of algorithmic governmentality—as data subjects are given tools to collect and
analyze their own data. Therefore, data processing is not necessarily under the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of algorithms nor professional analysts so much as increasingly diverse
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kinds of users that interact with and have access to algorithmic systems in different
ways. For this reason, algorithmic governmentality is altogether useful for questioning
whether there is such a thing is a definitive subject of algorithms, since the distinction
between behavior control (e.g., healthcare interventions) and self-control (e.g., quan-
tified self) is blurred and being blurred by algorithmic information systems [78]. In
turn, mixed semiotics suggests that these control and self-control dynamics implicate
systems of meaning that are distributed across subjects, algorithmic processes, and
interfaces—and they are never strictly invisible nor hierarchical.
In addition, it is noteworthy that the theories of algorithm representation and ra-
tionalization surveyed here call for a “counter-aesthetics” [36] or “counter-visuality” [86]
to existing representations of algorithms. These appeals to aesthetic and visual in-
tervention can be read as an argument about the function of signifying and mixed
semiotics in rationalizing or disputing the knowledge produced by algorithms, which
exceeds and yet supports the scope of algorithmic rationality. Rouvroy and Berns [82],
for example, are interested in “emancipation” from algorithmic governmentality, which
they define according to a subjective dissonance with “seemingly harmonious social
tools.” In other words, the subject-avoiding mechanisms of algorithmic governmental-
ity can be contested whenever they break down [90] or conflict with the interests of
subjects. Following from the notion of counter-aesthetics, we identify that this dis-
sonance paradigm also involves discursive, aesthetic, and political engagements with
algorithms.
For critical algorithm studies, this discourse it useful because it invites critical
studies of algorithms that are altogether less reactive to the failures of algorithms,
and more conducive to exploring their possible implications. It would also invite
abandoning the black box metaphor in favor of a more nuanced conceptualization of
algorithms that are rationalized by mixed semiotic or aesthetic regimes of meaning.
Rationalizations of algorithms do not depend on whether algorithms are represented
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or not, or whether they are represented accurately or not, but on how heterogeneous
“mixed” systems of meaning coalesce to produce intuitive meanings about algorithms
to subjects. Indeed, an appeal to counter-aesthetics in light of mixed semiotics, more
so than algorithmic governmentality and the surveillance–innovation complex, helps
to identify that discursive and aesthetic articulations of algorithms are important:
they entail changes in how algorithms are conceptualized.
To conclude, Sandvig’s [86] and Galloway’s [36] particular arguments question
whether designed representations (of algorithms) can at all be unproblematic, espe-
cially with respect to visualizations. This is a valuable assessment because whereas
algorithmic governmentality problematizes a-signifying semiotics, these critiques of
visualization problematize signifying semiotics as well. Therefore, the problem of
a-signifying semiotics proposed by algorithmic governmentality will not simply be re-
solved by signifying semiotics, and indeed these mixed semiotics must be conceived as
mutually interactional, if not mutually enforcing. ‘Opening the black box’ will only




Considered together, algorithmic governmentality and mixed semiotics help to iden-
tify that, although the subjects of algorithms can be marginalized from their decision-
making processes, the processes, effects, and motivations of algorithms are articulated
to subjects with recourse to diverse mixed systems of meaning. Accordingly, we might
turn to visualization as one instance of these systems, and study how algorithms are
rationalized by their semiotics. Importantly, such an inquiry would not conclusively
determine whether algorithmic governmentality exists or whether it is coextensive
with a rarefication of subjectification; instead, it would address how visualization
is implicated in rationalizations of algorithms. Therefore, this inquiry departs from
the specific critique staged by algorithmic governmentality, and considers more so its
illustration of an algorithmic rationality enhanced by mixed semiotics. The object
here is to identify how visualizations and rationalizations of algorithms are mutually
implicated by theories of algorithmic governmentality and mixed semiotics.
In this section I describe the design, development, and analysis of Lifestreams, a
collection of interactive data visualizations that I developed in order to study and
demonstrate the relationships between visualizations and rationalizations of algo-
rithms, specifically with respect to theories of algorithmic governmentality and mixed
semiotics. Following from mixed semiotics, this study of how visualizations (or any
systems of meaning) rationalize algorithms should not be reduced to a conclusive de-
termination or taxonomization of how specific semiological forms operate to produce
meaning. Rather, visualization is interpreted as producing a system of meaning that
is not strictly linguistic, can be interpreted by users in other ways than by language,
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and can be contested. This enables a special attention toward the visualization design
process, the algorithm development process, and visualization aesthetics, the latter
of which is commonly removed from visualization research. This altogether pushes
back against paradigms in human-computer interaction (HCI) that might study how
visualizations represent or rationalize algorithms; it instead foregrounds the proces-
sual, temporal, and dynamic character of meanings co-constructed among algorithms,
visualizations, their users, and their developers.
The purpose of Lifestreams is to examine interactive visualization in the rational-
ization of algorithms, using the three stages of algorithmic governmentality identified
by Rouvroy and Berns [82] (data collection, processing, application) as its point of
departure. Beyond this, Lifestreams is an experiment in expressing the premises of
algorithmic governmentality, mixed semiotics, and rationalizations of algorithms to
users through an interactive system. That is, whereas Lifestreams is used to examine
the ideas explored in this study, it also attempts to demonstrate these theoretical
relationships more comprehensibly. Altogether, the success or failure of Lifestreams
depends not on its ability to prove that mixed semiotics or visualizations are al-
ways involved or complicit in algorithmic governmentality, but rather to effectively
reveal how algorithmic governmentality and mixed semiotics can highlight the ways in
which algorithms are rationalized by visualization. Lastly, although Lifestreams is not
meant to challenge algorithmic governmentality or its rarefication of subjectification,
its implications with respect to these ideas will be elaborated in the Discussion.
3.1 Overview
Lifestreams (Figure 6) is a collection of algorithms and interactive data visualizations
that can be used to analyze the StudentLife dataset [100, 102]. The StudentLife
dataset was designed, implemented, and procured by a team of computer scientists at
Dartmouth College in order to “shine a light on student life” [102] in a way conducive
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to data-driven analysis. The StudentLife dataset contains various data about 48
students’ physiologies, academic performance, and opinions collected over a 10-week
term, primarily via a smartphone application installed on the students’ phones. The
StudentLife dataset is publicly accessible and downloadable online.
Lifestreams is designed in particular for use by data analysts who want to bet-
ter understand the Dartmouth student body, to determine which student behaviors
contribute to good academic performance, and to identify anomalous behaviors that
could put students at risk. Accordingly, Lifestreams is equipped with four visualiza-
tion components (Figure 6) that suit different kinds of data analysis, and are inter-
operable. The scatterplot uses dimensionality reduction algorithms (T-SNE [63] and
PCA [96]) to visualize the StudentLife students according to their overall similarities,
which allows groups of students to be selected and analyzed. The data table lists all
data variables imported from StudentLife into Lifestreams, allows these data variables
to be manually toggled on and off, and lists the average values for the students be-
ing analyzed. The location graph visualizes student movements between Dartmouth
campus buildings in a directed graph, which is derived from StudentLife wi-fi data,
and can be customized according to a series of simple ontologies: group by building,
group by building type, group by activity type. And the timeline visualizes student
temporal data over the course of a 10-week term. All components are linked such
that any selection in one is reflected in the others, and the scatterplot and location
graph animate in order to emphasize how changes between selections relate to the
data.
A typical scenario of using Lifestreams involves selecting certain data variables of
interest in order to group students by similarity according to those variables. These
groups are reflected in the scatterplot, which updates automatically. Groups of stu-
dents can then be selected from the scatterplot, which highlights their corresponding
data throughout the other visualization components (Figure 7). Data characteristics
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Figure 6: Lifestreams without any data selected. The scatterplot (top left) arranges
students from the StudentLife dataset according to the similarity of their data vari-
ables, which can be selected from the data table (bottom left). The location graph
(top right, enlarged to show detail) depicts the geographic movements of all students
according to their connections to wi-fi hot spots, which are collated here as differ-
ent Dartmouth academic departments and geographic regions. The timeline (bottom
right) depicts student temporal data (deadline counts, sleep hours, ability to stay
awake in class, stress levels, and conversation counts). Additional data variables from
the StudentLife dataset can be imported into Lifestreams.
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Figure 7: Lifestreams with four student points selected in the scatterplot. In doing
so, the data table updates to display quantitative information about the selected
students. Locations visited by the selected students are highlighted green in the
location graph. Data variables and locations that are statistically indicative of the
selected students are highlighted yellow, as are other student points that reflect these
similarities.
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that are statistically indicative of the selection (e.g., one standard deviation from the
mean) are made additionally prominent in order to allow for inferring broader rela-
tionships between student behaviors. For example, if the selected students have a low
cumulative GPA compared to the remainder of the population, then the cumulative
GPA value will be highlighted redder in the data table; if the selection frequents Dart-
mouth’s Sudikoff Laboratory relatively more than the remainder of the population,
then Sudikoff will be highlighted greener in the location graph. In addition, other
students and data that share similar properties to these are highlighted accordingly;
for example, other students that have low cumulative GPAs and frequent Sudikoff
are highlighted redder and greener. This reveals higher-level statistical relationships
throughout the population in a visual fashion that can be successively explored.
Lifestreams was designed and developed according to a data ontology that was
created to make the StudentLife data more conducive to data analysis. This ontology
organizes the StudentLife datasets into a hierarchy depending on their applicability
to certain kinds of analysis, and is in turn reflected in Lifestreams’s metadata scheme,
which enables the system to visualize data types in the interface components that suit
their analysis. Accordingly, the individual visualization components in Lifestreams
reflect the structure of this data ontology.
3.2 Precedents
The decision to produce a visualization in order to research it is informed by a diverse
body of research in design theory, media studies, critical algorithm studies, and com-
putational pedagogy. Making visualizations and algorithmic systems like Lifestreams
affords critical algorithm researchers the opportunity to trace information systems
not only according to the content that they represent to users, but also according
to their processual development. Therefore, this analysis concerns not only visual-
ization as a product, but also visualization as a process and a practice that reveals
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certain dimensions of how algorithms are rationalized. Meanwhile, and following
from appeals to designing ‘counter-aesthetics’ [36, 86], Lifestreams operates to study
how making visualizations can contribute to an original understanding of algorithmic
rationalizations. This is a highly reflexive task that follows from a series of ‘research-
through-design’ [108] and ‘research-creation’ [13] precedents, which broadly entail the
use of a design practice to investigate or produce research theory.
Lifestreams can be positioned at the intersection of imaginary media studies [69],
critical making [76], and procedural literacy [19]. Imaginary media studies aims to
develop fictional alternatives to existing media platforms in order to study them,
and critical making emphasizes a practice of playing with this space of alternatives
through activities of hands-on construction. In both cases, the experience of pro-
ducing, witnessing, or discussing designs takes precedence over establishing their im-
mediate functional utility. Similarly, procedural literacy encourages the design of
critical and pedagogical platforms that enable experimentation with procedures, such
as the logical processes of algorithms. Although procedural literacy’s definition of
procedure extends beyond the scope of algorithmic logic, it nonetheless tends to pro-
mote instantiating procedural rules in interactive, modifiable, and therefore typically
computational environments. Lifestreams is both a speculative and procedural de-
sign project because it envisions an imaginary regime of using algorithms, and yet
it enlists real data and visualization tools in order to do so. And it approaches the
directives of procedural literacy by enabling users to experiment with the statistical
and logical procedures of algorithms.
Some pedagogical platforms that approach this intersection between speculative
and critical design, critical making, and procedural literacy already. Matt Ratto
and Jean-François Blanchette’s “It’s a Series of Tubes” [87] workshop invites par-
ticipants to design a network communications protocol for interacting with a car
track set, which teaches about the computational design of packet flows and their
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politics. Carl DiSalvo and Jonathan Lukens’s “Neighborhood Networks” [62] pro-
gram adopts a critical and speculative design approach to developing technological
literacy. Tom Jenkins’s and Ian Bogost’s “Tiny Tinkering Platform” [52] promotes
accessible experimentation with devices in an ‘Internet of Things.’ Elements from
each of these projects are evident in RYBN’s “Antidatamining” [85], which offers a
pluggable platform for experimenting with the mechanisms of algorithmic trading.
Each project, developed for procedural literacy, critical making, or speculative de-
sign, uses design—hands-on or imagined—to identify, articulate, and make accessible
the implications and effects of algorithmic operations. Such a focus, especially for
Figure 8: Interactive visualization of “p-hacking” [5], wherein users experiment with
variables in order ‘cherry pick’ statistically significant correlations.
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“Antidatamining” in particular, is also to attend to a dynamical or “feral” model of
algorithms which reveals patterns that emerge from interactions with and between
algorithms, refusing to reduce algorithms to strictly deterministic engineering prob-
lems [35].
More specialized solutions to developing procedural literacy include “educational
testbeds” [55] in computer science pedagogies that teach algorithm design through
experimentation with programmable agents in virtual environments, as well as “ex-
plorable explanations” [99] that have made algorithms visually interactive in or-
der to teach how they work (also see Google TensorFlow’s “Neural Network Play-
ground” [89]). Although the majority of these platforms lack an emphasis on criti-
cality, open-ended design, and the political implications of procedures—indeed these
considerations are less trivial to implement into code—some outstanding instances
exist. FiveThirtyEight’s interactive explanation of “p-hacking” [5] (Figure 8) demon-
strates how data variables can be cherry picked to yield statistically significant, “pub-
lishable” correlations. “Serious games” can incorporate politically sensitive material
into the content or procedures of video games [10].
Finally, some of Ned Rossiter’s research explores how field studies about logistical
media, work performance metrics, and the algorithms that guide them can be ren-
dered as interactive games and speculative interfaces [79]. A noteworthy example of
this approach is Logistical Worlds [17], which accompanies a documentation about
labor management infrastructures with visualizations and games that simulate the
scenarios concerned, rendering them accessible to research and reflection. In this way,
Rossiter’s work with Soenke Zehle extends the notion of “procedural literacy” to a call
for a “parametric politics” [107], which encourages experimenting with algorithmic
parameters, procedures, and their political implications. A parametric politics draws
inspiration from anonymity and piracy discourse in order to encourage (re)purposing
algorithms to political applications, especially in order to reveal the political and
51
epistemic implications of algorithms [21]. Following from Johanna Drucker’s call for
“aesthetic provocations” in designing computational systems [29], aesthetics should
be understood as a dimension of this form of experimentation. Such a consideration
is supported altogether by the theories of mixed semiotics and algorithm aesthetics
addressed in this study.
3.3 Method
Lifestreams follows from “imaginary media studies” [69] and “critical making” [76]
in order to investigate how designing, implementing, and experimenting with algo-
rithms enables studying relationships that emerge from their designed arrangement.
It draws particular inspiration from research projects such as Antidatamining [85]
and Logistical Worlds [17], which leverage a practice of both implementing and ex-
hibiting visualizations in order interrogate properties of data, algorithms, and their
relationships to visual representation. This particular approach enables investigating
both the process and product of developing Lifestreams as an extended interaction
between media, algorithmic, and semiotic elements. Accordingly, Lifestreams was
developed according to three steps that were designed in order to study the process
and product of visualization development. First, I obtained and studied an existing
dataset to examine its relationship to the ‘data collection’ stage proposed by Rou-
vroy and Berns; second, I developed algorithmic and interactive visualizations that
implemented elements of the ‘data application’ stage; and third, I noted how the
development and form of these visualizations rationalized algorithms, especially in
light of theories of algorithmic governmentality and mixed semiotics. The implica-
tions and considerations made over the course of designing these three steps, prior to
implementing them, are elaborated as follows.
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3.3.1 Dataset
The point of departure for Lifestreams was to implicate interactive visualization in
the rationalization of algorithms, which could be framed according to the three stages
of algorithmic governmentality identified by Rouvroy and Berns: data collection,
processing, and application. Following from the precedents discussed in the section
above, I used a publicly accessible dataset to implement a visualization that would
speculatively contextualize how ‘real’ data might be purposed and used. Although
‘synthetic’ data could be generated that could still be operationalized by algorithms
and visualized, the value of ‘real’ data is to relate these algorithmic operations and
visualizations to actual algorithmic subjects and ‘data collection’ procedures. In
particular, the chosen StudentLife dataset [102] was produced according to a variety of
needs that developed out of project goals, institutional collaborations, and protracted
engagements with study participants. Therefore, the StudentLife data expresses a rich
diversity of real constraints that manifest as idiosyncrasies that might not be evident
in ‘synthetic’ data—including missing data and inappropriate participant responses.
These artifacts not only shape Lifestreams’s design, but also enable this study to
consider a stage of ‘data collection,’ which occurs prior to the StudentLife dataset
and yet is manifest in its presentation, structure, and content.
The StudentLife dataset was also selected for evidencing aspects of algorithmic
governmentality. Whereas the StudentLife project involves a ‘data collection’ appa-
ratus that requires direct participation from its subjects in order to function, Stu-
dentLife also involves ‘data processing’ outcomes in which subject profiles are used to
produce knowledge about their behaviors according to statistical relations between
data variables. Altogether the StudentLife project involves an “evaluation of mental
health and academic performance” [100] that is correlated to a variety of other het-
erogeneous data variables. StudentLife never ‘applies’ this data to its subjects, but
altogether rationalizes the implementation and use of ‘data application’ algorithms,
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which might “provide tips” [100] to students according to inferences about their aca-
demic performance. The StudentLife project produced a dataset, a data collection
apparatus, a body of data processing work, and data application implications that all
might be unpacked according to algorithmic governmentality and mixed semiotics.
Although the StudentLife dataset was published with a documentation of its data,
documenting the data manually presented an opportunity for me to interpret the data
content and structure without assistance—as is often required in other scenarios of
data analysis—and also to compare findings from my own ‘data archaeology’ with
the official documentation. This process resulted in a data guide that I referred to
throughout developing Lifestreams, particularly in order to organize its development
and design. Furthermore, when I experimented with simple statistical correlations
among data variables of interest, I realized the need for a more advanced data on-
tology, which entailed designing a data structure that was more conducive to data
analysis. Altogether, the development of the data guide and ontology informed the
actual design of Lifestreams—what algorithms it uses, how its visualizations are or-
ganized—which suggests the importance of attending to the process of visualization
development inasmuch as its outcome.
Altogether, that Lifestreams implements a ‘real’ dataset means that it can be
actually applied to analyzing the StudentLife data. Therefore, although Lifestreams
is a purely speculative product that intends to highlight certain aspects of algorithmic
rationalizations, it is also a working tool that can be used in practice. Additionally, in
this way, Lifestreams rationalizes the StudentLife dataset and its operationalization
by demonstrating that the dataset can be meaningfully used. Whereas the StudentLife
dataset is already rationalized by its online presentation and academic accreditations,
Lifestreams joins this ecology of StudentLife applications and makes its own claim for
how the data might be employed.
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3.3.2 Design
Although existing visualizations that evidence rationalizations of algorithms could
be studied in practice, the value of developing a visualization from scratch (that is,
from raw data) is to reveal how rationalizations of algorithms are implemented or
otherwise emerge from the constraints of data analysis. Granted, because developing
an algorithmic system from scratch entails a degree of authorial or creative flexibility
that comes at the cost of empirical validity, developing and studying Lifestreams does
not conclusively determine whether algorithmic governmentality or its rarefication of
subjectification exists, or whether visualizations need be involved in this process. In-
stead, Lifestreams identifies to what extent interactive visualization may be involved
in rationalizations of algorithms, whether in accordance with a theory of algorithmic
governmentality or not. In addition, Lifestreams retains a significant degree of empir-
ical legitimacy because it is implemented within the constraints of computation and
‘real’ data. Therefore, as a kind of speculative design bounded by the constraints of
‘real’ data and computational capabilities, Lifestreams is an experiment in realizing
a realistic a probable space of algorithmic practice.
If StudentLife represents mostly a stage of data collection (as a caveat, data pro-
cessing is involved in all data collection, and that the StudentLife is publicly accessible
beckons its application in some manner), then Lifestreams would represent mostly a
stage of data processing. As discussed, data processing can be rationalized by visual
analytic systems that operationalize algorithms, by visual or metaphorical represen-
tations of algorithms, or perhaps by pitch black boxes. As this study is particularly
interested in the implications of the former, Lifestreams is designed for a hypotheti-
cal scenario in which a data analyst is determining and operationalizing algorithmic
inferences about the StudentLife data. To reiterate, whether this analyst should be
considered a subject of algorithmic governmentality is indeterminate, but for the pur-
poses of studying rationalizations of algorithms, the general premise of algorithmic
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governmentality applies. Altogether, Lifestreams could certainly be used by its own
data subjects (i.e., the StudentLife study participants) or made publicly available in
a way that would aestheticize or rationalize the directives or applications of the Stu-
dentLife project. Therefore, that Lifestreams is designed for data analysts should not
invalidate its implications for data subjects, and these kinds of users may very well
be one in the same.
Data application exists in Lifestreams only to the extent described by Rouvroy and
Berns, whereby predictive inferences are made about subjects without their knowl-
edge. For example, when Lifestreams is used to identify “high performers” (i.e., good
students), it can be read as exhibiting a kind of data application according to the
‘production of knowledge.’ Beyond this, and with the exception of how Lifestreams
could be applied to aestheticize the StudentLife project, other kinds of data appli-
cation—such as actually affecting subject behavior according to algorithmic infer-
ences—are generally excluded from Lifestreams’s design. This is due in part to the
fact that a speculative implementation of this kind of data application to the subjects
of the ‘real’ StudentLife data would be grossly unrealistic and contrived. Although
Lifestreams does not intend to be realistic, it is supposed to be authentic to how the
StudentLife data might be foreseeably and reasonably operationalized. Therefore,
including this form of data application in Lifestreams would require additional con-
siderations about how algorithms would be applied to subjects in the physical world,
and how subject behaviors would be affected in real time, which would exceed this
study’s scope.
An important design focus in developing Lifestreams was to enable its users to
compare human and algorithmic decision-making, to reveal compromises between
them, and to understand their relationships in light of mixed semiotics. This focus
prompted the incorporation of a series of algorithms and visualization techniques that
effectively related rationalizations of algorithms to the premises of mixed semiotics
56
and algorithmic governmentality. These considerations, as well as how they were
informed by the actual constraints of the StudentLife data, will be discussed.
3.3.3 Development
As said, developing an algorithmic visualization from scratch presented an oppor-
tunity to implicate the development process in rationalizations of algorithms. This
demanded keeping a journal throughout this process. Throughout the process of de-
veloping the data guide, designing the data ontology, pre-processing the data, and
implementing Lifestreams, I noted the relationships between algorithmic governmen-
tality, mixed semiotics, and rationalizations of algorithms. However, to reiterate,
although this study involves applying a mixed semiotic framework to the codes and
structures of data, algorithms, and visualizations, it does not intend to determine how
these codes and structures are universally implicated in rationalizations of algorithms.
For this, case studies or empirical examinations of existing algorithmic systems might
be better suited (as in Langlois [57]). Instead, the function of research-through-
design [108] and research-creation [13] in this study is to examine the processuality
and procedurality of how visualization is implicated in rationalizations of algorithms,
which a mixed semiotics framework can help to reveal.
3.4 Findings
The notes taken over the course of developing Lifestreams are elaborated as follows,
according to three parts that reflect the development process: Dataset, Design, and
Development. Dataset concerns my exploration of the StudentLife dataset, its docu-
mentation, and its public presentation, in order to determine how Lifestreams should
be designed. Design describes how I developed a plan for operationalizing this data,
which influenced the final design of the Lifestreams interface. Development docu-
ments my implementation of this plan, as well as the challenges and opportunities
raised. Each of these parts includes some notes about how the development process
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was motivated by algorithmic governmentality, mixed semiotics, and rationalizations
of algorithms. However, it is in the following Discussion section that the theoretical
implications of these notes are cohesively synthesized and discussed, especially with
respect to using the Lifestreams interface.
3.4.1 Dataset
Consistent with algorithmic governmentality, the StudentLife data was dispersed and
prefigurative in a way that avoided particular considerations about its ultimate ap-
plications. Indeed, although the StudentLife dataset as a collection was not dispersed
and prefigurative in that it was structured, organized, and presented as a coherent
package, its comprising datasets were often unrelated to one another and were not
labeled with any definitive purposes. In other words, the ultimate applications of
each individual dataset within the StudentLife dataset were undefined, and therefore
their implications for students (the data subjects) were indeterminate. As opposed
to intending to reveal something in particular about students, the data was collected
under the nebulous directive of “studying the health and performance of students”
according to “the impact of stress, mood, workload, sociability, sleep and mental
health on academic performance” [100], and was later operationalized in various ways
according to correlations between data variables (e.g., inferring GPA [103], inferring
stress [50]). Some StudentLife directives, however, such as being “interested in how
students’ mood changes during the day” [102], may have influenced the collection of
certain data. Altogether, the discursive presentation of the StudentLife dataset privi-
leged statistical relations between data variables in data processing over an adherence
to hypotheses established in advance.
The StudentLife dataset contains a number of individual datasets that each rep-
resent a particular data variable1: e.g., student stress, sleep, location. The purposes
1“Dataset” and “data variable” are used somewhat interchangeably here, although where
“dataset” is used to refer to a collection of some data, "data variable” refers to the information
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of some StudentLife datasets were more clear than others. For example, whereas
the grades.csv dataset entailed direct implications for understanding student aca-
demic performance, it was more ambiguous how the class seating position dataset
might be applied.2 Furthermore, the format and content of the datasets influenced
to what extent their operationalization had implications for subjects. For example,
whereas the wifi dataset contained the same information as the wifi_location
dataset, the latter represented the alphanumeric identifiers of wi-fi ‘hot spots’ (i.e.,
the MAC addresses of access points) as the proper names of Dartmouth buildings.
In light of mixed semiotics, this example in particular reveals a contrast between the
a-signifying semiotics of wifi data and the signifying semiotics of wifi_location
data, the latter of which can be more trivially related to student behaviors. Like
grades data, wifi_location data consists of signifying semiotics that have more di-
rect implications for interpreting students according to their data. Futhermore, that
certain datasets are more intelligible and applicable in this way might incentivize
their use: the StudentLife developers deliberately converted the wifi dataset into the
wifi_location dataset in order to render it more intelligibly and accessibly [102];
accordingly, I only used the latter dataset in my analysis.
The meaning and format of each data variable is documented on the StudentLife
website, and additional information about how these data were collected and derived
is available in academic publications posted there. Whereas the titles of the datasets
(e.g., conversation) already confer to understanding their contents and potential
applications, the data documentation on the StudentLife website elaborates what
about subjects that a given dataset provides. A dataset (or database, data table) contains one or
more data variables (e.g., stress, sleep, location) and one or more data instances (e.g., individual
subjects, students). Algorithms, for example, enlist multiple data variables to make inferences about
data instances—information about which is provided in data sets.
2Notwithstanding the fact that some students manipulated the seating position data collection
system to insert website addresses into the data.
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these data are, how they were collected, and sometimes how they were algorithmi-
cally derived. Given that the datasets are documented to varying levels of detail, the
StudentLife data documentation can be read as an argument that articulates the over-
all functions and purposes of the StudentLife data collection system and dataset. For
example, certain datasets were not described in the data documentation: app_usage,
calendar, call_log, dinning [sic], and sms, which might suggest that these data
were collected and yet deemed relatively irrelevant to StudentLife goals, or altogether
uninsightful or unfit for analysis. In addition, with the exception of dinning, these
undocumented data variables were related to routine smartphone storage processes,
which might account for their omission. Accordingly, the StudentLife data docu-
mentation might be seen to reflect both the project’s goals and the constraints of
its system architecture. With respect to mixed semiotics, this relationship could be
productively viewed as the way in which the a-signifying constraints of algorithms
and algorithmic systems confer to certain signifying semiotics, whether in the form of
dataset titles or documentations; in turn, when mixed at the level of the Lifestreams
interface, these specific relationships become less clear.
Conversely, there were data variables that were documented on the StudentLife
website but omitted from the StudentLife dataset. For example, student Facebook
data was removed from the StudentLife dataset with the note, “not sure we can
release this until we are convinced it is fully anonymized” [100]. Anonymization con-
cerns the removal of personally-identifiable information (PII) [56] from data, which
includes information such as personal names, geographic locations, or in the case of
Facebook, browsing history or friendships. Interpreting anonymization according to
mixed semiotics suggests that data which cannot be cleaved from signifying semiotics
is simply not rationalizable under certain circumstances of use, which is determined
in part by data collection and application norms. Therefore, removing PII from data,
or removing PII data from datasets, entails a removal of signifying semiotics from
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data. For example, another example of data removed due to anonymity concerns in
the StudentLife dataset is the “opportunistic face logging” data [101], which captured
photographs of student’s faces when they interacted with StudentLife questionnaires.
Whereas algorithmic applications of this data were unsuccessful [101], the signifying
semiotics of students’ faces prevent them from being publicly accessible and ana-
lyzable. That the StudentLife dataset, like most all data, is stripped of signifying
semiotics in this way, should be interpreted in light of the critique developed by algo-
rithmic governmentality: information systems may altogether privilege a-signifying
semiotics that are removed from subject-oriented categories.
Ecological momentary assessments (EMAs) [91] are a significant part of the Stu-
dentLife dataset for collecting data about student opinions, moods, and activities,
usually in the form of text-based questionnaires. The StudentLife project admin-
istered these EMAs eight times a day on average, and was principally concerned
with ensuring student “compliance,” which is a measure of voluntary participation in
EMA and other data collection procedures [102]. For example, compliance diminished
over the course of the semester because students “discarded repetitive EMAs as the
novelty wore off,” and so compliance was incentivized by sending email reminders to
students and awarding merchandise to top data “collectors” [102]. Therefore, whereas
some data collection procedures are generally invisible and occur in the background
of students’ smartphones, EMA data collection involves highly visible algorithmic
apparatuses that incentivize subject participation. In addition, signifying semiotics
in the form of nomenclature like “compliance” and “collectors” ascribe subjective
identities to data subjects, in order to incentivize their participation and perhaps
to de-incentivize their non-compliance. To note, EMAs also prompt a high degree
of subjective reflection from data subjects, which could make this kind of data an
exception to algorithmic governmentality.
Documentation about EMA questionnaires was not directly accessible from the
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StudentLife website, but was found within the dataset, in the file EMA_definition.json
(Figure 9). As a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) file, EMA_definition.json is
a nested hierarchy of information that is both human-interpretable and computer-
readable, which makes it particularly well-suited to programming and developing a
data collection system like StudentLife. For example, when the StudentLife develop-
ers want to add a new question to the list of possible EMAs, they could simply write
it into EMA_definition.json; in addition, when the student responses to the EMAs
are collected in data, EMA_definition.json would help data analysts to understand
what each of the responses mean. Most important to attend to in acknowledging this
is how certain parts of the StudentLife data collection and processing system are more
interpretable in this way, and are accordingly translatable or adaptable to other sce-
narios of use, such as data documentation in the case of EMA_definition.json. That
EMA questionnaires leverage signifying semiotics more so than other data collection
processes is an important factor to consider in why this occurs.
Altogether, the inclusion of EMA_definition.json in the StudentLife dataset
might raise the question about why other ancillary files or scripts are excluded. This
suggests that cleaning and deletion procedures beyond the scope of removing PII
went into ensuring that the StudentLife dataset was publicly presentable. In this
way, whereas StudentLife is a record of data, it is also a record of data collection
and pre-processing procedures that ensured the dataset’s presentability. Viewed in
this way, the data analysis and application processes that StudentLife enables are
constrained both by the data its data and its formatting, which is determined in part
by data collection norms like removing PII.
Although the concern of this study is the StudentLife dataset, its operational-
ization by algorithms, and the rationalization of these algorithms, the StudentLife
website that hosts and introduces this data cannot not be overlooked for rational-
izing the collection, processing, and application of StudentLife data. For example,
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Figure 9: EMA_definition.json from the Studentlife dataset [102], with two
multiple-choice EMA questions defined: Social and Class.
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the first sub-heading on the StudentLife website frames the dataset according to a
metaphor of “rhythm”—“Is there a rhythm to the Dartmouth term?” [100]—which,
following Sandvig, we might read as metaphor that characterizes the StudentLife data
collection system and dataset as objective or describable in physical terms. Rhythm
in particular entails a natural order or cycle in Dartmouth student behaviors that
rationalizes the motivation of the StudentLife project, which is articulated as an
initiative to understand and reveal this order. Indeed, although finding a rhythm in
Dartmouth student behavior according to the university’s schedule is trivial, invoking
a rhythm metaphor rationalizes StudentLife data collection, processing, and applica-
tion by grounding these apparatuses in a claim that can be perceived as a matter
of fact. On the StudentLife website, the rhythm metaphor is followed by a series of
graphs that represent this rhythm graphically in a series of graphs (Figure 10). The
lines of the curves make an argument that multiple data variables in the StudentLife
dataset (e.g., gym, deadlines, mood) have rhythmic inter-relationships and might be
accordingly interrelated or correlated.
Alongside statistical inferences derived from the StudentLife data is an embed-
ded YouTube video entitled “Your Phone Knows Your GPA” [100], which describes
the general motivations and outcomes of the StudentLife project. In the video, the
StudentLife system is advertised as smartphone application that can sense student
Figure 10: Visualizations of Dartmouth term “rhythms” on the StudentLife web-
site [100], which depicts how certain Studentlife variables change over the course of
the Dartmouth term in a correlative fashion.
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behaviors and help them adjust these behaviors to improve their academic perfor-
mance: “Imagine a world where a student simply checks their phone to see if their
behavior is in sync with their desired GPA. If not, the phone provides tips on how
to get back on track.” Because this directive is generally inconsistent with the goals
of StudentLife described on the website and in publications, such as identifying “the
impact of stress, mood, workload, sociability, sleep and mental health on academic
performance” [100], it might be interpreted as one of many data applications of the
StudentLife data. The “Your Phone Knows Your GPA” video altogether reflects a
playful style and videography aesthetic that might not suit more formal academic
outlets, and therefore should be interpreted as a different kind of rationalization than
provided by the StudentLife academic publications. The video is perhaps less serious
and intentional, but also might suit a different, ‘broader’ audience.
The video also summarizes results from the StudentLife study according to four
statistical insights about “high performers”: they experience “an increase in stress
levels up to the midterm period followed by a gradual decrease to the end of the
term,” they “had shorter conversations during the evening and night periods later
in the term,” they “spent more time studying,” and “they were more conscientious”
(the latter point is accompanied by footage of a student making a to-do list). These
statistical relationships between student behavior and academic performance warrant
consideration as instantiating some premises of algorithmic governmentality. Whereas
these inferred relationships between data variables are not applied directly to affect
student behaviors, they are used to present an argument about the rationality of the
StudentLife data collection system and dataset, which might be leveraged to correlate
student behavior and academic performance.
The StudentLife website [100] includes “Publications” and “Presentations” sec-
tions, which list the academic publications and presentations in which the StudentLife
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dataset has been used or cited. This documentation is set alongside an “In Press” sec-
tion that lists the news and academic organizations that have discussed StudentLife.
Although it is without saying that these lists of citations and mentions rationalize
the StudentLife project, what is more interesting to note is that these elements are
privileged in the website structure over the data documentation, or a diagram of
the dataset itself. The StudentLife dataset does not speak for itself, but is rather
introduced according to a series of metaphors, explanations, and accreditations that
rationalize its creation and application.
3.4.2 Design
In order to use or analyze the StudentLife dataset, I needed to further understand
how each of its data variables could be related to one another and operationalized
through algorithms and visualizations. This was the impetus for developing a data
guide, which I referred to in order to experiment with simple statistical correlations
between data variables.
Initial statistical experiments did not return anything interesting outside of what
the StudentLife project had already identified: data variables that were correlated
to high or low grades. It was also tedious to clean and pre-process each dataset in
order for it to be used, which was the impetus for developing a more comprehen-
sive data ontology. The ontology is structured according to the properties of the
datasets, which supports their more efficient ‘ingestion’ by the Lifestreams data pro-
cessing pipeline. At the highest level, the ontology is divided into temporal and non-
temporal data, because whether data is recorded over time or whether it represents
a subject’s unchanging trait, influences how it can be used. Whereas both temporal
and non-temporal data are further divided into quantitative (e.g., numerical) and
qualitative (e.g., text response) data, temporal data can also involve ‘event’ data,
which is temporal but not necessarily quantitative nor qualitative. Location data in
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the StudentLife dataset is also temporal, and although it is either quantitative (e.g.,
GPS location) or nominal (e.g., wi-fi location), location data has special features that
warrant its placement in a separate category. Within these sub-categories, each of
the data variables from the data guide were manually sorted accordingly.
Whereas the data guide or documentation is a legible organization of the Stu-
dentLife data, the data ontology is a structured hierarchy that better suits data
analysis and algorithmic operations. For example, data variables in the same on-
tological sub-categories can be handled in a similar programmatic manner, which
expedites pre-processing. On the other hand, data variables in different categories
need to be handled differently, which can reveal relationships between the data cat-
egories and how they might interact. For example, temporal qualitative data can be
converted into temporal event data (e.g., a text response to a question is treated as
an event), and temporal event data can be converted into quantitative data. (e.g.,
studying events can be converted to whether a student is studying or not at any
given time). These inter-category relationships are crucial for relating data variables
to one another or understanding the extent of their possible analysis. Much like a
JSON file, a data ontology is like a compromise between a human-interpretable and
a computer-readable structuration of data. Indeed, my pre-processing approach used
the data ontology to output a metadata.json file, which Lifestreams would use to
visualize individual data variables appropriately.
Data formats, values, and documentation all influenced the outcome of the data
ontology; in turn, my plan for operationalizing this data was influenced by the ontol-
ogy. Following from algorithmic governmentality, I noted how the non-temporal data
category was conducive to developing subject ‘profiles’ [82]: the non-temporal data
of grades and survey responses were trivially representable as profiles that could be
compared to one another algorithmically. This insight made developing Lifestreams
more tractable, because I could start from student profiles and ‘build out’ to other
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algorithmic inferences that incorporated more data types, like qualitative and tempo-
ral data. This pattern of data analysis was informed by the general constraints and
capabilities of algorithms, which are most trivially applied to non-temporal quanti-
tative data, and cannot so easily be applied to qualitative data (e.g., in StudentLife,
survey and EMA questionnaire data), which is more heterogeneous. Although there
are many ways to operationalize qualitative data, both the heterogeneity of the Stu-
dentLife data and the fundamental constraints of algorithms rendered this approach
extraneous.
From the basis of student profiles derived from non-temporal data, and planning
to ‘build out’ to other data types thereafter, I developed a data processing plan
that would inform both the design and development of Lifestreams. The purpose
of this plan was to successively incorporate data types into Lifestreams, but also to
demonstrate these successive stages of data processing through the actual Lifestreams
interface: for example, one part of Lifestreams could represent strictly non-temporal
data in student profiles, and other parts could represent other data types. My initial
plan was to separate each of these parts into distinct, successive phases of interaction,
but this did not allow the different data types to be viewed alongside one another
interactively. Accordingly, I designed each of the data types into separate components
in the same visualization interface, which allowed their relationships to be revealed
interactively. This design pattern is consistent with many visual analytic interfaces,
which incorporate multiple visualizations into one interface instead of relying on one
visualization technique to perform all analyses. It is a design paradigm that reflects
the heterogeneity of data and the fact that data can be summarized and visualized
in multiple ways.
Each step in designing how to implement data types into Lifestreams is elaborated
as follows. Each step reflects categories in the data ontology, which served as a guide
in their design. To be clear, these design considerations were determined before
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implementing the data into Lifestreams.
3.4.2.1 Non-Temporal Data
Student profiles can be created by incorporating each student’s non-temporal data
into a data object that represents them. If each of these data objects has the same
structure, they can each be related to one another programmatically, which is the
function of ‘profiles’ as identified by algorithmic governmentality. This in turn en-
ables algorithmic inferences about a student’s interests and predilections, which can
be calculated with respect to the profiles of other students. Following from algorith-
mic governmentality and the directives of the StudentLife project, this would enable
answering the questions: what students are related according to their data, how could
these relationships be simplified to understand the student body better? Of particu-
lar interest here was GPA data, given the discursive presentation of the StudentLife
dataset (“your phone knows your GPA”), but also questionnaire data that represented
student opinions about political events on the Dartmouth campus. In particular, stu-
dent opinions on campus protests and the Boston Bombing incident prompted by
the StudentLife EMAs reflected an opportunity to understand how algorithms might
operationalize sensitive opinion data with respect to other data variables.
Data profiles can be processed by a wide variety algorithms, but unsupervised
machine learning algorithms support this study best because they can identify rela-
tionships between data profiles according to statistical relations between data vari-
ables. For example, ‘clustering’ algorithms can group student profiles into ‘clusters’
based on the similarity of their data. Lifestreams, however, uses ‘dimensionality re-
duction’ algorithms because they also calculate the relative importance of each data
variable. This means that, whereas clustering algorithms treat all data variables as
equally important, dimensionality reduction algorithms can operate to identify which
data variables are statistically more useful than others. Furthermore, dimensionality
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reduction algorithms are particularly suited to expressing relationships between algo-
rithms and visualization: because they can reduce a dataset of multiple data variables
into a dataset of two data variables, the resulting two-dimensional data can be visu-
alized on a two-dimensional plane. This allows for a human-interpretable depiction
of algorithmic inferences, and importantly, without the overly suggestive output of
‘clusters.’ That is, for dimensionality reduction, groups among student profiles are
not placed into discrete categories, but are rather made visible according to the rel-
ative proximities between data points. In this way, dimensionality reduction can be
read as both a portrait of algorithmic governmentality—it programmatically instan-
tiates a prioritization of statistical relationships between data variables—and also a
caricature of mixed semiotics—it produces a ‘de-territorialized’ depiction of relations
between data elements that evidences a-signifying semiotics.
The T-SNE [63] dimensionality reduction algorithm was selected in particular be-
cause it could operate in a high-dimensional space as demanded by the StudentLife
dataset, because it can reflect multiple relationships in a high-dimensional space vi-
sually, and because its stochastic process reveals how the algorithm is working in real
time. The PCA [96] dimensionality reduction algorithm is also included in Lifestreams
for the sake of comparison with T-SNE, which enables comparing the algorithms’ vi-
sual representations, their performance, and their applicability to certain data types.
Fundamentally, the ‘bias’ of PCA is in favor of data variables that have the highest
statistical ‘variance’ (the rationale being that data variables with a high variance
characterize the data best), whereas T-SNE is suited to visualization because it priv-
ileges retaining relationships between each pair of data points, although irrespective
of their overall arrangement.
In addition, an important design feature for Lifestreams was to give users the
option to select data variables manually—without the assistance of machine learn-
ing and dimensionality reduction—in order to experiment with statistical inferences
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and to compare their selections with algorithmic ones. Such a focus was informed
by FiveThirtyEight’s “p-hacking” [5] widget (Figure 8), which allows its users to
interact with variables in order to interactively design statistically significant corre-
lations. But rather than demonstrating that dubious statistical inferences can be
produced, Lifestreams intends to show how toggling data variables off and on de-
termines the visual outputs of algorithms, which might be involved in rationalizing
them. Altogether, dimensionality reduction, and especially T-SNE, is suited to such
an experiment because it can yield varying and yet comparable visual results.
3.4.2.2 Temporal Data
Incorporating temporal data into the existing profiles of non-temporal data yielded a
series of relationships between data variables that suggested some additional options
for data analysis. Specifically, in addition to algorithmically inferring non-temporal
predictions from non-temporal data by relating student profiles to one another, non-
temporal data could be used to predict temporal data, and vice-versa. In addition,
these inferential relationships could be manually adjusted by users as enabled by tog-
gling data variables in dimensionality reduction. At this point I developed a metadata
scheme that would programmatically indicate to Lifestreams where to include each of
the data variables I decided to include. For example, GPA data would be nested under
features (non-temporal data) as [[‘gpa’, [‘total’, ‘semester’, ‘class’]],
whereas sleep data would be nested under temporal as [‘sleep’, ‘semester’, 0,
15], where ‘semester’ indicates that the data spans an entire 10 weeks and 0 and
15 designate the minimum and maximum data values. Like EMA_definition.json,
this metadata.json file operated as an interface between a human and programmatic
interpretation of the data.
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3.4.2.3 Location Data
Incorporating location data was more difficult than incorporating temporal data be-
cause, although StudentLife location data is formatted as temporal ‘event’ data, it
is more informative as chronological ‘sequence’ data. This means that additional in-
formation can be derived from the order in which location events occur (sequences),
or whether students have certain location chronologies in common (sequential pat-
terns). To visualize these sequential patterns across all students, I chose to represent
all of the location data as a directed graph or node-link diagram. A directed graph
contains ‘nodes’ that are linked to one another by ‘edges,’ which can be used to rep-
resent locations (as nodes) and movements between them (as edges). Although a
directed graph is not an algorithm per se, in Lifestreams it is derived algorithmically
in two ways: first, data is algorithmically processed into a sequential format and then
into a graph-based format; second, ‘layout’ algorithms determine how the nodes and
edges should be visually arranged. Both of these algorithms can be modified, which
influences not only how the directed graph is visualized, but also whether it reveals
certain relationships between data variables or data profiles. Therefore, I planned for
Lifestreams to allow users to customize one of these algorithms in a simple way.
3.4.2.4 Event Data
Event data, which is non-continuous temporal data, is relevant to a stage of ‘data
application’ in algorithmic governmentality, because it entails the prediction and en-
actment of ‘events’ that affect subject behavior. That is, an ‘event’ can represent a
behavioral circumstance that represents a subject’s state (which might be predicted
in advance), or can represent an action enacted in order to cause another event to
(not) occur (as in ‘just-in-time adaptive intervention’ (JITAI) in healthcare [67]).
Although these predictions and interventions could be simulated in Lifestreams, as
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discussed, data application departs from the reasonable scope of this study. Event-
based predictions and interventions in particular involve a protracted relationship
with the needs and concerns of data subjects that would be in poor taste to simu-
late or caricature in a speculative visualization. Nonetheless, more involved work in
speculatively and critically examining the implications of event-based predictions and
interventions should be pursued.
3.4.3 Development
With the data ontology and processing plan in place, I could begin developing the
actual data pipeline that would ingest the StudentLife data into Lifestreams. I used
a standalone Python script to pre-process the data variables and generate the meta-
data scheme, so whenever I wanted to incorporate new data variables or change their
formats, I could edit and execute this script. I then used a JavaScript stack (Node3,
Webpack4, React5, D36) to ingest the pre-processed data and render it as interac-
tive visualizations. The development considerations and challenges for the specific
visualization components are as follows.
3.4.3.1 Profiles
I began data analysis by aggregating non-temporal student data into profiles. For
legibility, I represented each student profile as a data object that contained a nested
representation of the data obtained from each student. Because some data was in-
complete, certain students did not have certain data variables, which was reflected by
missing elements in each student’s data structure. However, in order to relate these
profiles to one another algorithmically, they needed to be represented in an exactly






that would store all of each student’s data variables in a single ‘flattened’ instance:
an array of numbers, each of which related to a specific data variable. The function of
what is called a ‘data table’ is the same as this: the indexical relationships between
data variables (e.g., grades, survey responses) are preserved across data instances
(i.e., students) in order to be more efficiently processed by algorithms.
Converting the data variables into a flattened, algorithmically-interpretable vari-
able is a part of ‘data cleaning.’ If the flattened data was to remain strictly human-
interpretable, it would be trivial to copy each data variable into its appropriate index.
However, since the data variables needed to be computable, particularly according
to dimensionality reduction, and more specifically by T-SNE, they needed to be spe-
cially formatted. Trivially, for example, whereas GPA can simply be stored in the
flattened variable because it is already quantitative, nominal data obtained from
multiple choice EMAs had to be quantified. In addition, class data was a particular
challenge because it was stored as a list of classes for each student (e.g., Chemistry,
Chinese, Psychology). In order to lend this data to dimensionality reduction, I used a
‘one hot’ approach to convert each class to a boolean variable for each student: e.g.,
if a student takes only Chemistry, then their Chemistry data variable is given a value
of 1 (true), and their Chinese and Psychology data variables are both given a value
of 0 (false).
Missing data also posed a particular challenge for simple statistical inferences in
Lifestreams. For example, if missing GPA data was indicated numerically as 0 or
-1, then it would affect the average GPA across all students. Accordingly, I had
to programmatically ignore missing data (designated by -1) when calculating data
averages across students. Moreover, data formatted using a ‘one hot’ approach was
never treated as missing, because it reflects a boolean condition that is either true or
false. For example, if a student had no class data, then they would be given a value of
0 (false) for every class that exists in the StudentLife dataset, whether or not it was
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true that the student actually took zero classes. This imposes an assumption about
the data that is reflected in Lifestreams: the interface declares that the average value
for having class COCS 065 is only 0.9, when in fact all students in the Lifestreams
study should have been enrolled in COCS 065 [102]. This is because the COCS 065
is treated as either true or false, when in fact it is sometimes neither, in the event
that data is missing.
3.4.3.2 Dimensionality Reduction
In order to produce interpretable visual patterns with T-SNE, I experimented with
learning rates, iteration counts, and parameters that would determine how the data
points would be arranged. To test the algorithm, I used synthetic data to ensure that
similar data elements were positioned closer together. Since T-SNE is stochastic,
groups of similar data are located in different places every time the algorithm is
executed, but they should still retain their relative closeness or ‘local’ arrangements.
The use of synthetic data to implement and debug T-SNE can be understood to
demonstrate how algorithms can be agnostic to the signifying semiotics of data, which
can refer to grades, stress, or random values and yet can still be operationalized.
Similarly, like many other visual analytic systems, Lifestreams can be applied to
other datasets so long as they are pre-processed into a similar format.
I implemented a selection feature that allowed me to highlight a group of data
elements in the dimensionality reduction scatterplot. Incidentally, I could see how
groups of data elements were preserved across executions of T-SNE (Figure 11). This
feature was powerful not only for ensuring that T-SNE was running properly, but also
for demonstrating how dimensionality reduction algorithms operate. In particular,
by animating the algorithms’ outputs between executions, and then by executing
the algorithms any time a data variable was toggled off or on, animations between
algorithm outputs revealed some of their underlying logics and biases (Figure 12).
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Whereas each iteration of T-SNE’s execution can be visualized in a way that animates
the data elements, PCA does not involve iterations that lend themselves to animation,
and so Lifestreams simply animates between the algorithm’s outputs. Altogether,
because PCA’s output only changes when its input data variables are changed, and not
every time the algorithm is executed, its animations are perhaps even better suited to
revealing how the algorithm operates programmatically (compare Figures 11 and 12).
Lastly, unlike T-SNE, PCA will not operate unless more than one data variable is
selected, and so Lifestreams must prohibit this action with a pop-up alert.
3.4.3.3 Location Graph
To visualize the students’ location data, I interpreted the wifi_location data as
locational sequence data that could be rendered as a directed graph, where each
wi-fi location corresponded to a node in the graph. This involved writing a sim-
ple algorithm that would iterate through the wifi_location data and store it in a
graph-based data structure. Whereas each node in the graph represented a wi-fi loca-
tion, each edge represented a student’s movement from one location to another. The
emergent effect of this approach is a map of all wi-fi locations in the data, which are
Figure 11: Every time the T-SNE dimensionality reduction is executed, it arranges
the student data points differently. However, ‘local’ arrangements, like a selection of
six students (left, highlighted green), are still preserved across iterations (middle and
right).
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connected according to student movements between them. Importantly, an inherent
assumption here is that a student’s wi-fi data is indicative of their location, which
requires that all students possess their mobile devices at all times; where in fact, the
StudentLife developers removed data at times during which the StudentLife app was
deemed not on a student’s person [102]. In addition, the Lifestreams algorithm that
processes the wi-fi data naively assumes that any adjacent wi-fi locations represent
a movement between these locations, which is untrue in the event that a student’s
mobile device is disabled or not connected to the Internet at a brief point in time.
This is the reason that location data processing algorithm might be developed ac-
cording to a spatiotemporal ontology, which would determine programmatically, to
varying degrees of confidence, what patterns in data qualify as a student’s presence
at a location or movement between locations.
In comparison to GPS data, which consists of quantitative latitude and longitude
positions, wi-fi data is nominal and so can be more easily grouped according to loca-
tional commonalities between students. Therefore, if Lifestreams used GPS instead of
Figure 12: When data variables are turned off in Lifestreams, the PCA scatterplot
animates each time (left to right). Although some changes are minor (left to middle),
other changes are more significant, like the horizontal axis being flipped (middle
to right). This occurs because PCA recomputes which variables are statistically
significant, updates the visualization accordingly, and does not make the axes reflect
any data variables in particular. The axes are of a-signifying semiotics.
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wi-fi location data to visualize student locations, additional data processing assump-
tions would be involved developing a spatiotemporal ontology. For example, one
approach might be to divide geography into a grid, and determine student locations
accordingly [105]. Altogether, for either wi-fi or GPS data, processing location data
and defining spatiotemporal ontologies is always a matter of relating data to signifying
semiotics in a process of literal territorialization. Although these territories can then
be related to other data variables, operationalized, and thereby de-territorialized,
contextualizing location data with signifying semiotics is generally essential.
Figure 13: Lifestreams with the location graph (top right) set to the activity ontology,
which collates network locations according to the behavioral activities that they entail.
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To illustrate this, Lifestreams gives users three options to change the location
graph according to very naive spatiotemporal ontologies: network, college, and activ-
ity. Network simply groups locations according to the names of wi-fi locations in the
data, college groups locations according to which academic department they belong
to, and activity (Figure 13) groups locations by the behavioral activity that they en-
tail (e.g., academic, dining, extracurricular). In order to group by college and activity,
I manually labeled every location in the StudentLife dataset according to information
about each location that I gathered online. This was an insightful experiment in
ascribing signifying meanings to data elements according to publicly accessible and
sometimes subjective information. Whereas a veteran Dartmouth student might dis-
agree with my classifications (e.g., a dining hall may actually be a popular studying
location for students), an algorithm (or designer) that scrapes the internet to produce
these labels would not incorporate these nuances.
Visualizing the directed graph of student locations required more work to ensure
legibility than was required by the dimensionality reduction algorithms. Whereas the
two-dimensional output of the dimensionality reductions can be plotted directly to a
two-dimensional space, a directed graph has no necessary visual form and needs to be
arranged according to a layout algorithm. Although I did not need to implement this
layout algorithm from scratch (and used the D3 visualization programming language
instead), I did need to manipulate it in order for the resulting visualization to be
intelligible. In particular, I ensured that graph nodes retained a certain distance
from one another, and that the nodes with the most frequented edges were closest
together. In addition, I used curve edges to indicate bi-directionality, where moving
clockwise along the curves indicates direction.
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3.4.3.4 Timelines
Visualizing the temporal data as timelines was relatively simple. In order to compen-
sate for missing temporal data, I used the D3 visualization programming language
to define which parts of the timeline line should be displayed, and used a round
stroke-linecap to reveal isolated temporal data points.
3.4.3.5 Interrelationships
I implemented ‘brush-and-link’ functionality between the visualization elements in
order to reveal relationships between them. Trivially, for example, selecting students
in the scatterplot highlights the data for those students in the location graph and
the timeline (all active data in the data table is highlighted). But in order to reveal
more informative, statistical relationships between data variables, I also included dif-
ferent layers of highlighting that indicated whether data variables were statistically
related. In the current version of Lifestreams, when students are selected, other stu-
dents that exhibit similar traits according to standard deviations are also highlighted.
The location graph also uses a more sophisticated approach that highlights locations
and movements that are especially characteristic of selected students: if a student
is responsible for a certain percentage of traffic at a given location or route, then
that location or route is highlighted. The intention in highlighting these statistical
relationships is to reveal more relationships between data variables outside of what is
already visualized in the dimensionality reduction scatterplot and via brush-and-link.
3.5 Discussion
Lifestreams presents a collection of interactive data visualizations developed in or-
der to study and demonstrate the relationships between visualizations and ratio-
nalizations of algorithms, which is specifically informed by theories of algorithmic
governmentality and mixed semiotics. To review, the algorithms implemented into
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Lifestreams include ‘data-cleaning’ or pre-processing algorithms, dimensionality re-
duction algorithms (T-SNE and PCA), graph definition and layout algorithms (in-
cluding network, college, and activity ontologies), and statistical correlations between
data variables that are defined interactively. In addition, the StudentLife dataset
ingested into Lifestreams entails an algorithmic data collection and processing ap-
paratus that might also be rationalized by Lifestreams. To be clear, although every
visualization and interaction library employed by Lifestreams involves algorithms, the
‘algorithms’ concerned here are those that have implications for algorithmic govern-
mentality; that is, they collect and operationalize data about subjects.
After developing Lifestreams and collating notes about the development process,
common themes were organized into a series of discussion points. Each discussion
point was informed by considering Lifestreams in light of the categories of algorith-
mic governmentality—data collection, processing, application—as well as according
to this study’s examples of mixed semiotic rationalizations of algorithms: gamifica-
tion, visualization, recommendation, innovation, metaphorization, aestheticization.
However, some of these considerations motivated multiple discussion points, some
inspired none (considering the Lifestreams visualization in light of visualization is
not very insightful), and almost all were collated, and so the three resulting topics no
longer reflect the categories of algorithmic governmentality nor the examples of mixed
semiotics. Instead, each is imagined as a genre of data analytics. For example, where
visual analytics might concern the use of visualization to analyze data, democratic
analytics might characterize the notion that democratic principles inhere in or are
leveraged by data analysis. This rhetorical illustration has the effect of fragmenting
the concept of data analytics and visual analytics into a series of sub-fields, each of




Central to this study is the argument that algorithmic information systems like in-
teractive visualizations present cohesive systems of meaning to users that shape their
perceptions of the purposes, functions, and effects of algorithms. Both the ‘partici-
patory turn’ and mixed semiotics support this claim, in that both help to identify in-
stances of human-computer interaction in which the meanings of information systems
seem inherent or immersive to users. Accordingly, diegetic analytics reads algorith-
mic information systems as immersive narratives that have diegetic and non-diegetic
storytelling elements. Consider Lifestreams: the graphic and interactive elements of
the visualization lend themselves to a directive of knowledge discovery or ‘information
foraging’ [72], in which the user is actively engaged in finding information according
to distributed visual and informational cues. Meanwhile, the possible consequences
of finding this information, or operationalizing it in the future, are somewhat re-
moved from the orienting graphics and interactions at hand—although the purpose
of Lifestreams may be to promote the welfare of data subjects (following from the
object of StudentLife), its immediate interactions cater more to the alchemical recom-
bination of data variables and subjects, which is in order to ascertain some information
about data. This is what the notion of machinic enslavement [59] attempts to ad-
dress: that human-computer interaction can be automatic or reflexive in a way that
makes it difficult for users to consider the implications of their interactions.
Therefore, when Rouvroy and Berns suggest that “inherent to contemporary sta-
tistical practice is the expression of individuals’ tacit adhesion” [82], we might con-
sider how presenting data subjects through Lifestreams expresses the StudentLife
students as inherently conducive and consensual to the analytic operations being per-
formed. That is, when Lifestreams is used, there is a tacit declaration that, firstly,
the StudentLife data subjects are commensurate [30] to the analytic operations be-
ing performed, and secondly, that these subjects consent to the performance of these
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operations. Accordingly, it is unclear whether the diegetic framing of Lifestreams
involves any consideration of human actors or individual subjects, because both the
analyst and the subjects of Lifestreams are not represented in the diegetic space of
visualization graphics and interactions. Instead, data points come to stand in for data
subjects, correlations between variables take visual precedence over the meanings of
these variables, and the Lifestreams user takes the role of a non-diegetic director,
coordinating the movements of data subjects qua data points. In light of mixed semi-
otics, Lifestreams would thus seem to entail a departure from signifying semiotics that
concedes to the de-territorialized, a-signifying semiotics of innumerable relationships
between variables and subjects.
However, diegetic analytics comes with a caveat: if we compare interactive visu-
alization to a diegetic frame, then we must also consider how this frame can rupture
at any point, exposing its underlying, non-diegetic framing devices. For Amazon, the
non-diegetic artifice of book recommendations is exposed whenever the recommenda-
tion algorithm malfunctions, but also when recommendations are inappropriate [3],
or perhaps even when they are uncannily appropriate (e.g., how did Amazon predict
that I wanted to purchase this book?). Accordingly, for Lifestreams, the inherent
diegesis of knowledge discovery is compromised whenever discovered relationships be-
tween data subjects or variables seem farfetched, unrealistic, or even dire. Colloquial
terms are useful for describing this paradigm: when something seems ‘off’ about
the information suggested by Lifestreams, whether because it seems like a ‘stretch’
or because its implications are so novel that its sudden emergence is questionable,
then the seamless coherence of Lifestreams is jeopardized. For this reason, diegetic
analytics suggests that the salience of certain data analytic ‘insights’ exposes the non-
diegetic artifice of data analysis, which opens it to scrutiny and critique, and which
implies that machinic enslavement is not as totalizing as suggested by algorithmic
governmentality.
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The Lifestreams scatterplot evidences this claim, because although it presents
salient relationships between data subjects according to a-signifying semiotics, the
algorithmic calculation of these relationships is subject to scrutiny. That is, when
Lifestreams positions data subjects in close proximity in the scatterplot, then salient
relationships, patterns, and groups that emerge from this arrangement become mean-
ingful a-signifying semiotics that can be referenced, discussed, or contested. The
same scenario applies to the statistical similarities presented by highlighting data in
Lifestreams: what is the underlying mechanism that suggests these data are related,
and when these relations are insightful, how were they derived? This furthermore sug-
gests that producing knowledge with algorithms entails a constant exchange between
presenting a-signifying semiotics and rationalizing them according to other systems
of meaning. Until a ‘total’ machinic enslavement or cybernetic ‘singularity,’ the a-
signifying semiotics of algorithms are subject to critique without some dependency
on signifying semiotics. In addition, the congruence or dissonance between signifying
and a-signifying semiotics is always subject to contestation.
Accordingly, if Alexander Galloway’s ‘banality of representation’ [36] suggests that
the representational capabilities of visualizations are fundamentally limited, then we
have implied here that this limitation is especially subject to critique. In Lifestreams,
for example, that data subjects are represented as data points (per the banality of
representation) is a configuration that might seem ‘off’ to users and thereby especially
suspect. However, this study has also described how social norms—especially in the
form of discursive and aesthetic regimes—contribute to whether the representations of
visualizations seem uncanny. Therefore, certain users might perceive information sys-
tems (like Lifestreams) and their representations (like subjects-as-points) differently,
some more enchanted or disenchanted by diegetic analytics. This altogether suggests
that banal, routine, or a-political interactions with visualizations are subject to cri-
tique: they reveal a difference or discrepancy between the banality of representation
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and the completeness of its referents.
Effectively, diegetic analytics enables a departure from representationalist debates
about whether visualization corresponds to reality ‘or not’ [66], and progresses instead
to considering how these representations nonetheless produce knowledge about algo-
rithms and their inferences. Following from Johanna Drucker [27], we might see this
shift as acknowledging the “representational force” of visualizations, which although
they are subjectively interpreted [28], produce knowledge. Incidentally, these con-
siderations depart from the consternation of machinic enslavement and black boxes
by acknowledging that algorithmic information systems, despite their effectiveness in
producing knowledge and meanings, must also be rationalized according to meanings
that suit individual subjects. A-signifying semiotics are manifest in data, algorithms,
and visualizations, but to conceptually remove them from signifying semiotics is ul-
timately a stretch. Mixed semiotics is therefore particularly suited to identifying
how these systems of meaning are exchanged or privileged in specific scenarios of
algorithmic practice and use.
Indeed, using algorithmic information systems like Lifestreams allows for some
negligence about the eventual implications of the knowledge discovered therein. And
yet, even if the Lifestreams user is removed from the data application process, then
the StudentLife developer or behavioral analyst that designs and tests the data appli-
cator is less so. Similarly, if the Lifestreams user is removed from the meaning of the
data, then the StudentLife data collector less so; if the Lifestreams user is removed
from the logic of the machine learning algorithms, then whoever implemented these
algorithms is less so. Indeed, who is most removed from this process is the StudentLife
students, which would entail that the ‘rarefication of subjectification’ [82] in algorith-
mic governmentality is more of a ‘displacement’ or ‘dispersion’ of subjectification
enabled by algorithmic paradigms of knowledge production. It is not so much that
how algorithms produce knowledge is invisible or absolutely reflexive but that the
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considerations underlying these logics are distributed across subjects, mechanisms,
and semiotics. Some considerations are delegated to the statistical reflexes of ma-
chine learning algorithms, but the question accordingly becomes when, where, why,
and how: if algorithmic governmentality is not indefinite, everywhere, inevitable, or
inherent, then we have additional opportunities for deciding how to interact with the
algorithmic episteme.
3.5.2 Magnetic Analytics
When algorithmic governmentality suggests that its techniques “more effective be-
cause they are blurred,” we might also witness how the roles of individual subjects are
blurred by a ‘displacement’ or ‘dispersion’ of subjectification processes. Diverse con-
stituents contribute to the algorithmic processes of StudentLife and Lifestreams, which
provides these subjects each with a semblance of participation in algorithmic gover-
nance, and yet obfuscates exactly what the effect of their participation is. There may
be signification and subjectification throughout these engagements—representations
of the StudentLife mission in videos [100], compliance incentives for “top collec-
tors” [102] —but the ambiguity of how these parts are integrated into Lifestreams
caters to the illusion that all decisions originate instead from Lifestreams. Given that
algorithmic information systems like Lifestreams are an outcome of de-territorialized
data, logical, and semiotic elements produced by subjects and devices, they may
operate to synthesize these parts into a cohesive “focal point” [59] of meaning. How-
ever, in acknowledging this, we must also recognize that this regime of meaning is
not totalizing, totally enslaving, or totally indicative of ‘the possible.’ Accordingly,
magnetic analytics imagines visualizations as attractive focal points that synthesize
diverse bodies of information and action, and although they divert attention from
the logic, materialities, and constituents of algorithms, to focus on them exclusively
requires additional diversionary forces.
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Interacting with Lifestreams in order to derive information from data prevents
having to parse the StudentLife data manually, let alone in accordance with consult-
ing the data documentation. Consequently, the value of Lifestreams is enhanced as a
matter of economy: it becomes a one-stop shop for deriving information from the Stu-
dentLife data. Furthermore, when inferences are made in Lifestreams, it is absolutely
unclear who or what is responsible for the specificity of the patterns revealed—e.g.,
why is this multiple-choice question on a scale of 7? why is standard deviation used
here? or how does PCA work? In fact, revealing these considerations to users is the
assignment of ‘data provenance,’ which is being increasingly incorporated into visual
analytics systems: representing data provenance reveals both the history of data pro-
cessing and its considerations, which can actually extend to data processing that is
decided by users in real time [47]. And yet, data provenance is only a collection of
data about data, which still supersedes consultation about why this meta-data was
selected for in the first place, and by whom. For magnetic analytics, a function of
what is called ‘data provenance’ is to avoid having to look ‘beyond’ the visualization
display.
In magnetic analytics, all algorithmic inferences appear to resonate from Lifestreams,
and yet nowhere do these algorithms have the first or the final say about how this
data should be collected, processed, and applied. Indeed, Lifestreams draws connec-
tions between data subjects in a way that forgets the provenance of data collection
and neglects the future of data application, but following from diegetic analytics,
Lifestreams is not the full story—that it represents (amounts to) the entire Stu-
dentLife and Lifestreams assemblage is an optical illusion. A reductive interpretation
of this might be to take the banality of representation, machinic enslavement, or black
box discourse in order to argue that users are stuck in the meanings of algorithms or
visualizations and absorbed into them. From this perspective, Lifestreams is the focal
point that its users attend to in order to make decisions—it provides ‘the possible.’
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On the other hand, following from the participatory turn, mixed semiotics, and an
aesthetics of algorithmic experience, Lifestreams is part and parcel of an enormous
rationalization of an algorithmic apparatus, which also has recourse to videos and
incentivization schemes—it is more an ‘economy of the possible,’ which incentivizes
certain patterns of interaction over others, but it does not mandate them.
Therefore, magnetic analytics is enabled in part by the semiotic properties of
data and algorithms (per algorithmic governmentality), but it is also rationalized by
imbricating regimes of discourse and aesthetics, including those provided by visual-
izations. For example, Rouvroy and Berns cite how algorithmic “blindness to socially
experienced categorizations (social, political, religious, ethnic, gendered, etc.) is the
recurrent argument used by advocates of these algorithms replacing human evalu-
ation” [106] (as cited in [82]). In other words, Lifestreams might be rationalized
because it is not prone to the same human biases of psychologists or sociologists.
However, following from the surveillance–innovation complex or an aesthetics of al-
gorithmic experience, we would see how this “argument used by advocates of these
algorithms" is one of discourse and aesthetics inasmuch as it leverages the semiotic
affordances of algorithms. For example, the StudentLife study suggests that profes-
sors with “such data available” as StudentLife have a less reductive interpretation
of student lives, and so prevents professors to judging students according to existing
categorizations like GPA [102]. Therefore, although StudentLife and Lifestreams as
algorithmic processes may be immune to certain categorizations, this feature in no
way presents itself to users without some discursive or aesthetic rationalization of it,
which is articulated in academic, journalistic, and public discourse.
Therefore, magnetic analytics pushes back against a conceptualization of algo-
rithmic information systems as material agglomerations of data, mechanisms, and
actors [58], opting instead for a sensitivity to the directionality or ‘force vector’ of
arguments that rationalize them. Instead of conceiving Lifestreams as an object
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with an inherent meaning that is removed from the processes of its construction and
hermeneutics, we interpret Lifestreams as an objectified deferral of human judgment
and considerations—like a talking machine, a mechanical turk, or a Wizard of Oz. In
this way, Lifestreams is not a peephole into algorithmic processes but a ‘focal point’
that is in open-ended dialogue with other forms of knowledge. It is the attractive
force of this focal point that entices black box discourse, which for its part treats
algorithms as all-or-nothing systems of meaning.
Following from mixed semiotics, then, we can begin to unravel how the system of
meaning afforded by Lifestreams is attractive and not totalizing. Lifestreams is a sys-
tem of mixed algorithmic, discursive, and graphic meanings that can be interpreted
to understand StudentLife student behaviors. As such, when these semiotics cohere
into salient patterns, Lifestreams operates as a proof by assembly that validates a par-
ticular construction of information. For instance, Lifestreams suggests that students
with the highest overall grades are also those with less class assignment deadlines.
That this relationship is revealed through Lifestreams suggests neither that this is
inherently true nor that Lifestreams has all of the information necessary to make this
claim (following from diegetic analytics), but that this data in composition with the
Lifestreams system has a new meaning that, in its being revealed, enhances that value
of all its parts.7
What is more is that, because StudentLife and Lifestreams both are capable of
revealing potentially valuable insights such as these, either of their proofs by assembly
suggest that usable data is useful data. This is not a tautology—it suggests that the
collection, processing, and application of data rationalizes its utility. That a collec-
tion of ‘sleep’ data exists in StudentLife already rationalizes the value of this data,
7To be clear, although a proof by assembly might appear to originate from StudentLife or
Lifestreams, following from mixed semiotics, it actually also a reflection of human valuations of
coherence and efficiency, both of which inhere in visualizations. In other words, that the visualiza-
tion ‘speaks for itself’ is an optical illusion, conceived here as an affordance of magnetic analytics.
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which had to be designed, procured, and formatted. That this data is collated along
with other data about ‘grades’ and ‘stress,’ accordingly, argues that these data vari-
ables can be meaningfully related. Therefore, this rationalization does not depend
exclusively on informational insights that come from this data (like correlations), but
also on the context provided by StudentLife or Lifestreams as a proof by assembly.
That is, like appeals to ‘open data,’ StudentLife and Lifestreams appeal to ‘assem-
bled data,’ which is a rationality with its own subjective, political, and semiotic parts
that are not exclusive to the dataset or visualization itself. This is demonstrated, for
example, by the StudentLife “opportunistic face logging” [101] research, which did
not rationalize StudentLife through information contents but rather through infor-
mation capabilities. More significantly, coupled with a ‘displacement’ or ‘dispersion’
of subjectification processes, Lifestreams confers to a structural harmony and unity
of information that is efficient and economical to attend to when interpreting the
StudentLife students. Supported by the participation of these students, the mission
statement on the StudentLife website, and this thesis, Lifestreams presents a cohesive
representation of so much labor, thought, and information that it is simply incredible.
3.5.3 Esoteric Analytics
Following from the banality of representation [36], Lifestreams is especially incredible
because it incorporates more circumstances and information than can be explicitly
represented in the visualization itself. The experiences and behaviors of StudentLife
students, for example, are present in Lifestreams but not graphically represented in
it, which is left to the user’s imagination. In turn, following from an aesthetics of
algorithmic experience [81] or metaphors of algorithms [86], Lifestreams compensates
for this overabundance by representing information in these terms nonetheless, which
confers to an illusion of completeness or comprehensiveness. That is, like on Ama-
zon.com [57], signifying semiotics in Lifestreams represent (account for) algorithmic
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processes and a-signifying semiotics by which students and locations are graphically
arranged. For esoteric analytics, this pattern of overabundance and reduction is
leveraged to rationalize algorithms: as opposed to hiding or obfuscating the logics
of algorithms in a black box, Lifestreams supplies them with signifying semiotics
(students-as-points, Dartmouth building locations, data variables) as a frame of ref-
erence. Esoteric analytics is the underlying logic of the ‘white box’: comprehensible
feigns comprehensive.
Esoteric analytics distracts from the implications ‘little analytics’ [2], which dis-
misses the totality of data in favor of statistical information and comprehension.
Following from algorithmic governmentality [82], algorithms are semiotically effective
at allowing this reductive motion to seem rational—their base traits and appearances
allow for it. In turn, the comprehensiveness of these algorithmic insights is ratio-
nalized all the more when they are made explicitly comprehensible. For example,
information derived from the StudentLife dataset is detailed and justified in aca-
demic publications. The function of Lifestreams in esoteric analytics is the same.
Through diegetic analytics, Lifestreams presents an interactive ‘information foraging’
scenario in which all discovered relations seem to have a trail of interactive opera-
tions and graphic movements. Indeed, this trail of operations can be captured in
‘insight provenance’ [47], which would represent exactly how these discoveries were
interactively achieved, thereby evidencing the knowledge discovery process. Then,
through magnetic analytics, Lifestreams justifies its particular construction and ren-
dition of evidence in a proof by assembly: that the StudentLife data variables and
subjects can be related to one another in salient and coherent patterns rationalizes
their mutual association. Together these effects are constitutive of esoteric analytics:
they dispel an image of reductive ‘little analytics’ by showing comprehensibly—not
comprehensively—how information was derived.
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The question that is raised here is why esoteric analytics is permissible or prefer-
able in the first place. It is not difficult to surmise a provisional answer. Firstly,
that labor and resources are invested into designing and implementing StudentLife
and Lifestreams demands their rationalization. For example, the StudentLife dataset
is made publicly accessible online, which rationalizes the utility of the data in and
of itself—following from either ‘open data’ [16] or ‘assembled data’ paradigms. Sim-
ilarly, the time spent to develop Lifestreams is rationalized throughout this thesis.
Secondly, and concurrently, these labor and resources implement infrastructures that
engender standards in an “practical politics” [59]. For example, Lifestreams suits a
particular kind of analysis that favors relationships between students and location
data, and therefore might incentivize (and rationalize) location data collection. More
significantly, that StudentLife publishes all of its data privileges any data analytic
system that leverages the existing StudentLife data as opposed to collecting it from
scratch, which would require more labor and resources.
The emergent effects of these ‘practical politics’ are what Ned Rossiter [79] terms
a “determination of relevance,” which characterizes the way in which existing stan-
dards (e.g., public StudentLife data) incentivize interoperable designs and actions
(e.g., using StudentLife data in Lifestreams).8 Following from an ‘economy of the
possible’ [59], a determination of relevance is not strictly material, and it is simul-
taneously constitutive of and supported by mixed discursive and aesthetic semiotic
regimes, which rationalize these standards in order to maintain their dependencies.
For example, John Backus [6] notes how programmers in the 1950’s obfuscated com-
puter science as an arcane practice in order to build dependencies on their fluency,
8Such a pattern is evident also in disclosing patents for public domain, which effectively reinforces
their value in a ‘determination of relevance.’ Alexander Galloway [38] and Tiziana Terranova [94]
describe these dynamics according to internet infrastructure, and Michel Serres [88] generalizes them
in his metaphysics.
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which Wendy Chun [14] likens to a kind of esoteric source code “sourcery” to impli-
cate contemporary algorithm scholars for doing the same. Such a paradigm is evident
more broadly according to what R. Joshua Scannell [8] terms “digital mysticism,”
which is a prevailing rationalization qua obfuscation of algorithms that operates “on
the grounds that the black box can, in fact, be deconstructed.” Therefore, the func-
tion of esoteric analytics is to rationalize the standards and dependencies manifest in
algorithmic information systems by representing their potential variety (e.g., of big
data) as a unitary system of meaning (e.g., of little analytics, or of visualizations).
To reiterate, magnetic analytics provides the centripetal force for this, and diegetic
analytics retains it, both of which are a function of algorithm semiotics as well as
discursive an aesthetic rationalizations.
What is additionally provided by esoteric analytics is a corrective regime in which
system faults can always be attributed to other ‘externalities’ [79], thereby maintain-
ing the sanctity of the system and its standards. For example, when StudentLife data
is incorrect—perhaps a student forgot to report that they had homework deadlines
one day—it the fault of the student as an externality. Similarly, “compliance” [102] is
a subjectivating term that lends support to this hierarchy of accountability, in which
a lack of adherence to following data collection protocols is attributed first to stu-
dents and only incidentally to StudentLife’s design. Accordingly, when Rouvroy and
Berns suggest that algorithmic governmentality “renders the very notion of misfire
meaningless; in other words, a misfire cannot ‘jeopardize’ the system, it is immedi-
ately re-ingested to further refine behavioral models of profiles” [82], it is rather that
the consequences of ‘false positives’ are exerted onto other constituents of the system
that it does not depend on—they can either be swapped out or corrected by casting
them as routine externalities. Esoteric analytics is precisely how this hierarchy of
accountability is achieved: it represents dependencies in order to obfuscate the many
ways that they might be otherwise conceived.
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Altogether, esoteric analytics enables us to re-imagine black box discourse as dis-
cursive, aesthetic, and complicit in enabling a reductive understanding of the power
and processuality of algorithms. The ‘black boxed’ algorithm is an objectification of
structural power dynamics that exist both prior to and in support of algorithms—just
like when algorithms are reductively caricatured as assembly lines or industrial ma-
chines [86]. The black box ‘problem,’ therefore, is not exclusively material but also dis-
cursive and aesthetic. Therefore, we err when we attempt to ‘reverse engineer’ [26, 18]
algorithms, which are material manifestations of diverse design considerations, indi-
vidual contributions, and subjective experiences. Such a reverse engineering approach
is ultimately effective because it treats algorithms as scapegoats that provide us some-
thing discrete and finite to blame. And yet, the ‘white box’ it produces only obfuscates
the actual construction and consequences of algorithms further. The black box and
the visualization are both scapegoats in this way, and they are effective because they
lend themselves to cohesive signifying semiotics.
Identifying an esoteric analytics suggests that there is, in fact, nothing magical
about algorithms. More magical than algorithms are the narratives that inhere in
their representations, aestheticizations, metaphorizations, and rationalizations. Such
is to acknowledge that algorithms enable new paradigms of knowledge production,
governance, and semiotics, and yet the difficulty in leveraging these capabilities as
well as holding them accountable hinges on how algorithms are rationalized. By em-
phasizing the discursive and aesthetic regimes of algorithms, we depart from decrying
the black box algorithm and bear witness to its non-diegetic construction and ratio-
nalization. Both visualization developers and critical scholars will play a part in this
process, perhaps in working toward a non-diegetic analytics that brings our era of




This study implicates visualization in the rationalization of algorithms by investi-
gating the design, development, and use of Lifestreams. It departs from a concep-
tualization of algorithms as entailing a pervasive, obtuse, black box hegemony in
order to examine the importance of semiotic, discursive, and aesthetic regimes of
meaning in rationalizing these algorithms. In this way, the study intends to broaden
considerations of how visualizations represent algorithms. Algorithms are not just
represented according to graphics (or enclosed within a black box); rather, interface
narratives, metaphors, and conventions shape popular appraisals of algorithms in
conversation with political discourse and legislation, metaphorical abstractions, and
artworks. Therefore, attending to these rationalizations, studying them, and indeed
designing them entails a politics of decision-making and knowledge production that
remains under the jurisdiction of human actors.
Algorithms are increasingly inherent to contemporary society, and visual analytics
is helpful for involving subjects in their operations. What we have seen is that subjects
are included in and removed from certain points of the data collection, processing,
and application pipeline in ways that are not so decisive as the black box metaphor
would have it. And yet, power dynamics still inhere in these information systems
whenever they produce knowledge. This does not entail the elimination of subjectifi-
cation, nor total machinic enslavement, but it does blur the techniques of algorithmic
governmentality, its subjects, and its interpretation. If anything, algorithms confer to
a paradigm of human-computer interaction that rationalizes algorithms in different
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ways than techniques of ‘control and self-control’ are rationalized by governmental-
ity proper. Algorithms do not just arrange data points or data subjects—they are
enlisted to rationalize how these configurations are arranged.
96
REFERENCES
[1] Adorno, T. W., “On the fetish character in music and the regression of
listening,” The essential Frankfurt school reader, pp. 270–99, 1991.
[2] Amoore, L. and Piotukh, V., “Life beyond big data: Governing with little
analytics,” Economy and Society, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 341–366, 2015.
[3] Ananny, M., “The curious connection between apps for gay men and sex
offenders,” The Atlantic, vol. 14, 2011.
[4] Arendt, H., A Report on the Banality of Evil. Faber, 1963.
[5] Aschwanden, C. and King, R., “Science isn’t broken,” August, vol. 11,
p. 2015, 2015.
[6] Backus, J., “Programming in america in the 1950s–some personal impres-
sions,” A History of Computing in the twentieth century, pp. 125–135, 1980.
[7] Ballard, S., Mitew, T., Law, J., and Stirling, J., “Data natures: the
politics and aesthetics of prediction,” 2016.
[8] Behar, K., Object-Oriented Feminism. University of Minnesota Press, 2016.
[9] Blanchette, J.-F., “The noise in the archive: Oblivion in the age of total
recall,” in Computers, Privacy and Data Protection: an Element of Choice,
pp. 25–38, Springer, 2011.
[10] Bogost, I., “Procedural rhetoric,” Persuasive games: The expressive power of
videogames, pp. 1–64, 2007.
[11] Bowker, G. C. and Star, S. L., “How things (actor-net) work: Classifi-
cation, magic and the ubiquity of standards,” Philosophia, vol. 25, no. 3-4,
pp. 195–220, 1996.
[12] Chalmers, M. and MacColl, I., “Seamful and seamless design in ubiquitous
computing,” inWorkshop at the crossroads: The interaction of HCI and systems
issues in UbiComp, vol. 8, 2003.
[13] Chapman, O. and Sawchuk, K., “Research-creation: Intervention, analysis
and" family resemblances",” Canadian Journal of Communication, vol. 37, no. 1,
p. 5, 2012.
[14] Chun, W. H. K., “On “sourcery,” or code as fetish,” Configurations, vol. 16,
no. 3, pp. 299–324, 2008.
97
[15] Clough, P. T., Gregory, K., Haber, B., and Scannell, R. J., “The dat-
alogical turn,” Non-Representational Methodologies: Re-Envisioning Research,
vol. 12, p. 146, 2015.
[16] Cohen, J. E., “The surveillance-innovation complex: The irony of the partic-
ipatory turn,” 2014.
[17] Cuevas, H., Hatzopoulos, P., Huws, U., Kambouri, E., Mezzadra,
S., Neilson, B., Rossiter, N., Samaddar, R., and Walters, W., “logis-
ticalworlds,” 2014.
[18] Datta, A., Sen, S., and Zick, Y., “Algorithmic transparency via quantitative
input influence: Theory and experiments with learning systems,” in Security
and Privacy (SP), 2016 IEEE Symposium on, pp. 598–617, IEEE, 2016.
[19] Davidson, D. and Mateas, M., “Procedural literacy: Educating the new
media practitioner,” On the Horizon, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 101–111, 2005.
[20] Davila, P., Visualization as Assemblage: How Modesty, Ethics, and Attach-
ment Inform a Critical Design Practice. PhD thesis, 2016.
[21] de Zeeuw, Daniel, Z. S. and Rossiter, N., “Of pirarchy, anonimity, and
parametric politics: an interview with ned rossiter and soenke zehle,” 2015.
[22] Deleuze, G., “Postscript on the societies of control,” October, vol. 59, pp. 3–7,
1992.
[23] Deleuze, G., Guattari, F., and others, A thousand plateaus. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
[24] Design, S. N., “Nike clc installation.”
[25] Designboom, “Super nature design: Nike china logistics center,” 2012.
[26] Diakopoulos, N., “Algorithmic accountability: Journalistic investigation of
computational power structures,” Digital Journalism, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 398–415,
2015.
[27] Drucker, J., “Humanities approaches to graphical display,” Digital Humani-
ties Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 1–21, 2011.
[28] Drucker, J., “Performative materiality and theoretical approaches to inter-
face,” Digital Humanities Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 1, 2013.
[29] Drucker, J. and Nowviskie, B., “Speculative computing: Aesthetic provo-
cations in humanities computing,” A companion to digital humanities, pp. 431–
447, 2004.
[30] Espeland, W. N. and Stevens, M. L., “Commensuration as a social pro-
cess,” Annual review of sociology, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 313–343, 1998.
98
[31] Evans, L., “How to build a map for nothing: Immaterial labour and location-
based social networking,” 2013.
[32] Foucault, M., Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the age of
reason. Vintage, 1988.
[33] Foucault, M., Security, territory, population: lectures at the Collège de
France, 1977-78. Springer, 2007.
[34] Foucault, M., Discipline & punish: The birth of the prison. Vintage, 2012.
[35] Fuller, M. and Matos, S., “Feral computing: From ubiquitous calculation
to wild interactions,” The Fibreculture Journal, no. 19 2011: Ubiquity, 2011.
[36] Galloway, A., “Are some things unrepresentable?,” Theory, Culture & Soci-
ety, vol. 28, no. 7-8, pp. 85–102, 2011.
[37] Galloway, A., “The poverty of philosophy: Realism and post-fordism,” Crit-
ical Inquiry, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 347–366, 2013.
[38] Galloway, A. R., Protocol, vol. 23. SAGE Publications London, Thousand
Oaks, CA and New Delhi, 2006.
[39] Gaylor, B., “Do not track,” 2015.
[40] Genosko, G., “Félix guattari,” Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities,
vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 129–140, 2003.
[41] Genosko, G., “Information and asignification,” FOOTPRINT, vol. 8, no. 1,
pp. 13–28, 2014.
[42] Genosko, G. and Bouissac, P., Critical Semiotics: Theory, from Informa-
tion to Affect. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016.
[43] Gillespie, T., Gillespie, T., Boczkowski, P., and Foot, K., “The rele-
vance of algorithms,” Media technologies: Essays on communication, material-
ity, and society, vol. 167, 2014.
[44] Gillespie, T. and Seaver, N., “Critical algorithm studies: A reading list,”
Socialmediacollective. org, 2016.
[45] Google, “How search works: From algorithms to answers,” 2013.
[46] Google, “Google dictionary,” 2017.
[47] Gotz, D. and Zhou, M. X., “Characterizing users’ visual analytic activity for
insight provenance,” Information Visualization, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 42–55, 2009.
99
[48] Green, D. P., Ha, S. E., and Bullock, J. G., “Enough already about
“black box” experiments: Studying mediation is more difficult than most schol-
ars suppose,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, vol. 628, no. 1, pp. 200–208, 2010.
[49] Guattari, F., Molecular revolution: Psychiatry and politics. Penguin Group
USA, 1984.
[50] Haim, S., Loeb, L., Wang, R., Zhou, X., Lord, S., and Campbell, A.,
“The mobile stress meter: A new way to measure stress using images,” ACM,
2015.
[51] Hajian, S., Bonchi, F., and Castillo, C., “Algorithmic bias: From discrim-
ination discovery to fairness-aware data mining,” in Proceedings of the 22nd
ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining, pp. 2125–2126, ACM, 2016.
[52] Jenkins, T. and Bogost, I., “Designing for the internet of things: prototyp-
ing material interactions,” in CHI’14 Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in
Computing Systems, pp. 731–740, ACM, 2014.
[53] Khoury, M. J., McBride, C. M., Schully, S. D., Ioannidis, J. P.,
Feero, W. G., Janssens, A. C. J., Gwinn, M., Simons-Morton, D. G.,
Bernhardt, J. M., Cargill, M., and others, “The scientific foundation
for personal genomics: recommendations from a national institutes of health–
centers for disease control and prevention multidisciplinary workshop,” Genetics
in Medicine, vol. 11, no. 8, pp. 559–567, 2009.
[54] Kittler, F., “Protected mode,” Draculas Vermachtnis: Technische Schriften,
pp. 208–24, 1993.
[55] Kowark, T., Muller, J., Muller, S., and Zeier, A., “An educational
testbed for the computational analysis of collaboration in early stages of soft-
ware development processes,” in System Sciences (HICSS), 2011 44th Hawaii
International Conference on, pp. 1–10, IEEE, 2011.
[56] Krishnamurthy, B. and Wills, C. E., “On the leakage of personally iden-
tifiable information via online social networks,” in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM
workshop on Online social networks, pp. 7–12, ACM, 2009.
[57] Langlois, G., The TechnoCultural Dimensions of Meaning. PhD thesis, Cite-
seer, 2008.
[58] Latour, B., “From aggregation to navigation: A few challenges for social
theory,” Closing Keynote Plenary, CHI, vol. 13, 2013.
[59] Lazzarato, M. and Jordan, J. D., Signs and machines: Capitalism and the
production of subjectivity. Semiotext (e) Los Angeles, 2014.
100
[60] Lingenfelter, D. and Khurshudov, A., “The black box paradox in big
data analytics and data-driven modeling,” 2014.
[61] Loukissas, Y. A., “Taking big data apart: local readings of composite media
collections,” Information, Communication & Society, vol. 20, no. 5, pp. 651–
664, 2017.
[62] Lukens, J. and DiSalvo, C., “Speculative design and technological fluency,”
International Journal of Learning and Media, 2012.
[63] Maaten, L. v. d. and Hinton, G., “Visualizing data using t-sne,” Journal
of Machine Learning Research, vol. 9, no. Nov, pp. 2579–2605, 2008.
[64] Mordvintsev, Alexander, O. C. and Tyka, M., “Deepdream: a code
example for visualizing neutral networks,” 2015.
[65] Murphy, D., “Nict’s daedalus creates beautiful 3d visuals to map out nasty
cyber attacks (video),” Engadget, 2012.
[66] Nacher Dr, A., “Internet of things and automation of imaging: beyond rep-
resentationalism,” communication+ 1, vol. 5, no. 1, p. 6, 2016.
[67] Nahum-Shani, I., Smith, S. N., Tewari, A., Witkiewitz, K., Collins,
L. M., Spring, B., and Murphy, S., “Just in time adaptive interventions (ji-
tais): An organizing framework for ongoing health behavior support,” Method-
ology Center technical report, no. 14-126, 2014.
[68] Norman, D. A., The design of everyday things: Revised and expanded edition.
Basic books, 2013.
[69] Parikka, J., What is media archaeology? John Wiley & Sons, 2013.
[70] Pasquale, F., The black box society: The secret algorithms that control money
and information. Harvard University Press, 2015.
[71] Pentland, A., Social physics: How good ideas spread-the lessons from a new
science. Penguin, 2014.
[72] Pirolli, P. and Card, S., “Information foraging.,” Psychological review,
vol. 106, no. 4, p. 643, 1999.
[73] Projects, Y. I., “Nike+ collab: City runs.”
[74] Puschmann, C. and Burgess, J., “Big data, big questions| metaphors of big
data,” International Journal of Communication, vol. 8, p. 20, 2014.
[75] Rancière, J., Aisthesis: Scenes from the aesthetic regime of art. Verso, 2013.
[76] Ratto, M., “Critical making: Conceptual and material studies in technology
and social life,” The Information Society, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 252–260, 2011.
101
[77] Reidsma, M., “Ethical ux,” 2017.
[78] Reigeluth, T., “Why data is not enough: Digital traces as control of self and
self-control,” Surveillance & Society, vol. 12, no. 2, p. 243, 2014.
[79] Rossiter, N., Software, Infrastructure, Labor: A Media Theory of Logistical
Nightmares. Routledge, 2016.
[80] Rossiter, N. and Zehle, S., “Locative media as logistical media: Situating
infrastructure and the governance of labor in supply-chain capitalism,” 2015.
[81] Rossiter, N. and Zehle, S., “The aesthetics of algorithmic experience,” The
Routledge Companion to Art and Politics, pp. 214–221, 2015.
[82] Rouvroy, A., Berns, T., and Libbrecht, E., “Algorithmic governmentality
and prospects of emancipation,” Réseaux, no. 1, pp. 163–196, 2013.
[83] Rouvroy, A., Hildebrandt, M., and De Vries, K., “The end (s) of cri-
tique,” Privacy, due process and the computational turn: The philosophy of law
meets the philosophy of technology, p. 143, 2013.
[84] Rouvroy, A. and Stiegler, B., “The digital regime of truth: From the
algorithmic governmentality to a new rule of law,”
[85] RYBN, “Antidatamining,” 2017.
[86] Sandvig, C., “Seeing the sort: The aesthetic and industrial defense of “the
algorithm”,” Journal of the New Media Caucus, 2014.
[87] Seitz, A., “It’s a series of tubes: Network neutrality in the united states and
how the current economic environment presents a unique opportunity to invest
in the future of the internet,” J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary, vol. 29, p. 683,
2009.
[88] Serres, M., Le parasite. Grasset, 1980.
[89] Smilkov, D., “A neural network playground,” 2017.
[90] Star, S. L. and Ruhleder, K., “Steps toward an ecology of infrastructure:
Design and access for large information spaces,” Information systems research,
vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 111–134, 1996.
[91] Stone, A. A. and Shiffman, S., “Ecological momentary assessment (ema)
in behavorial medicine.,” Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 1994.
[92] Striphas, T., “Algorithmic culture,” European Journal of Cultural Studies,
vol. 18, no. 4-5, pp. 395–412, 2015.
[93] Swan, M., “The quantified self: Fundamental disruption in big data science
and biological discovery,” Big Data, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 85–99, 2013.
102
[94] Terranova, T., Network culture: Politics for the information age. Pluto
Press, 2004.
[95] Thomas, J. J., Illuminating the path:[the research and development agenda
for visual analytics]. IEEE Computer Society, 2005.
[96] Tipping, M. E. and Bishop, C. M., “Probabilistic principal component anal-
ysis,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodol-
ogy), vol. 61, no. 3, pp. 611–622, 1999.
[97] Tiqqun, The Cybernetic Hypothesis. 2010.
[98] Tsavli, M., Efraimidis, P. S., Katos, V., and Mitrou, L., “Reengineering
the user: privacy concerns about personal data on smartphones,” Information
& Computer Security, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 394–405, 2015.
[99] Victor, B., “Explorable explanations,” Bret Victor, vol. 10, 2011.
[100] Wang, R., “Studentlife study,” 2017.
[101] Wang, R., Campbell, A. T., and Zhou, X., “Using opportunistic face log-
ging from smartphone to infer mental health: challenges and future directions,”
in Adjunct Proceedings of the 2015 ACM International Joint Conference on
Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing and Proceedings of the 2015 ACM Inter-
national Symposium on Wearable Computers, pp. 683–692, ACM, 2015.
[102] Wang, R., Chen, F., Chen, Z., Li, T., Harari, G., Tignor, S., Zhou,
X., Ben-Zeev, D., and Campbell, A. T., “Studentlife: assessing mental
health, academic performance and behavioral trends of college students using
smartphones,” in Proceedings of the 2014 ACM International Joint Conference
on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing, pp. 3–14, ACM, 2014.
[103] Wang, R., Harari, G., Hao, P., Zhou, X., and Campbell, A. T., “Smart-
gpa: how smartphones can assess and predict academic performance of college
students,” in Proceedings of the 2015 ACM international joint conference on
pervasive and ubiquitous computing, pp. 295–306, ACM, 2015.
[104] Widman, J., “Presenting edgerank: A guide to facebook’s newsfeed algo-
rithm,” 2011.
[105] Yuan, M. and Nara, A., “Space-time analytics of tracks for the understand-
ing of patterns of life,” in Space-Time Integration in Geography and GIScience,
pp. 373–398, Springer, 2015.
[106] Zarsky, T. Z., “Governmental data mining and its alternatives,” Penn St. L.
Rev., vol. 116, p. 285, 2011.
[107] Zehle, S. and Rossiter, N., “Algorithmic architectures, logistical media, and
the rise of black box politics,” The Routledge Companion to Labor and Media,
p. 40, 2015.
103
[108] Zimmerman, J., Forlizzi, J., and Evenson, S., “Research through design
as a method for interaction design research in hci,” in Proceedings of the SIGCHI
conference on Human factors in computing systems, pp. 493–502, ACM, 2007.
104
